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Abstract 
 
Yupiget of the Chukchi Autonomous Okrug, Russian Federation are the only Inuit in the 
circumpolar north who do not hold a formal agreement with the state regarding self-governance, 
nor do they have any formal means of control over the range of activities carried out on their 
traditional lands. This thesis will examine this circumpolar anomaly by using historical 
institutionalism to help explain how political changes at the domestic and international levels, 
and over three distinct time periods have affected Yupiget struggles for self-determination and 
political autonomy. A documentary analysis supplemented with key informant interviews has 
shown that Yupiget involvement with international Indigenous organizations such as the ICC is 
instrumental in maintaining ties to their Inuit counterparts and inclusion in Arctic policy-making. 
Furthermore, Russia’s increasingly centralized legislative and legal institutions are hindering the 
further development of non-governmental organizations while redefining a distinctly Russian 
variation of civil society. While Yupiget political development is currently impeded, changes in 
the domestic political situation in Russia and/or Chukotka could lead to a redoubling of efforts of 
the international community to support their political autonomy.	
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Chapter 1: Introduction   	
 Inuit throughout the circumpolar north are increasingly engaging with their respective 
states in political activities in order to preserve their cultures and traditions, and to regain control 
over their traditional lands and daily affairs. Inupiaq and Central Yupiit in Alaska are 
beneficiaries of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971. Greenland’s Kalaallit 
established “Home Rule” in 1979, and later “Self Rule” in 2009. In Canada, the Inuvialuit Final 
Agreement settled Inuvialuit land claims in 1984 followed by the creation of the territory of 
Nunavut with the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement in 1999, the Labrador Inuit Land Claims and 
Self-Government Agreement in 2005 and finally the Nunavik Inuit Land Claims Agreement in 
2006.  
Yupiget1 from the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug in the Russian Federation are the only 
Inuit in the circumpolar north without a formal agreement with the state regarding political 
autonomy, or any recognized means of control over the range of activities carried out on their 
traditional lands. In fact, the Russian state increasingly restricts their ability to operate and 
participate in their own civil society institutions. However, Yupiget participation in the Inuit 
Circumpolar Council (ICC) simultaneously enables them access to decision-making processes 
that affect their traditional territories at the international and circumpolar level, while allowing 
them to share in the experiences of their Inuit kin in cultivating and re-establishing their own 
domestic political, economic and cultural practices. In fact, the ICC currently provides the only 
forum with which to support and develop Yupiget political agency.  
The object of this thesis is to help explain this circumpolar anomaly. There appears to be 																																																								
1 Yupiget is used in this thesis to describe the Inuit residents of Russia’s Far East. “Yupik” and “Yupiget” are used as 
the singular and plural forms because Yupiget use neither the terms “Inuk” nor “Inuit” to describe themselves. 
“Yupiget” differentiates Russian Inuit from their Alaskan (Central) Yupiit cousins. 
	 2 
two sets of clashing institutional forces affecting Yupiget: Russian government institutions such 
as the federal and regional governments and international cooperative institutions such as the 
ICC and the Arctic Council. This inquiry is concerned with which set of institutions is 
dominating.  Lately, institutions of the Russian state are increasingly edging out the influence of 
Yupiget international relations.  Whereas international relations have been instrumental in 
establishing and maintaining self-determination for other Inuit across the circumpolar north, 
Yupiget still struggle for political autonomy largely because they face a very different internal 
institutional context and their foreign ties evoke suspicion from the Russian state.  An in-depth 
examination of the historical trajectories of the institutions established throughout the Soviet 
period and into the 21st century will help explain the current situation and assess the future 
prospects for Yupiget political autonomy and self-determination in the Russian Federation.  
 Little research has been conducted regarding the political institutions and organizations 
involved in the decision-making processes that both directly and indirectly impact Yupiget 
today. Through the process of gathering literature for this thesis, there appears to be a paucity of 
English language political research regarding not just Yupiget and other Indigenous peoples of 
the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug (Chukotka), but Indigenous peoples in the Russian Federation 
in general. Scholarly research regarding Yupiget is largely anthropological and very few studies 
have examined particularly their political activities at home and abroad. Authors such as 
Diatchkova (2001; 2002; 2010), Gray (2001; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2012), Kertulla (2000), Krupnik 
and Chlenov (2007; 2013), Krupnik and Vakhtin (1997; 2002), Poelzer (1996), Schindler (1992; 
1994; 1996), Sillanpåå (2005) Thompson (2002; 2008), and Wilson and Kormos (2015) have 
investigated a range of political phenomena in Chukotka, involving both Indigenous and settler 
populations. While their works are extremely insightful and valuable, stark changes in the 
political landscape in Russia over the last decade compel a narrower case study and a more up-
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to-date inquiry. One of the main purposes of this research is to focus on Yupiget political 
development and to analyze and explain the current state of Yupiget political autonomy.  
Research Question 
 The rigid institutions of the Soviet Union and its successor state, the Russian Federation, 
greatly influence the degree to which Yupiget can participate in decision-making on their 
ancestral territories and in their traditional political, economic and social activities. Currently, the 
Russian state maintains a strong influence on the development of, and participation in, civil 
society. The Soviet Union too maintained ultimate control over civil society. However, influence 
and control of the state has shifted over time. While there was a great deal of hope and optimism 
in the late Soviet and early post-Soviet periods, the last 15 years or so mark a steady decline in 
the development of civil society within Russia. In fact, Russian authorities have already 
interfered in the local organization of Yupik individuals and Indigenous groups at the regional 
and national levels, making it difficult for Yupiget to effectively use their collective voice. In this 
thesis, I will examine their struggle to preserve their culture, language and traditional ways 
through participation in the institutions established by both state and non-state actors, and the 
relationships maintained between these institutions and individuals.  
 This research is guided by the broad question: How have shifting institutional contexts 
influenced Yupiget ability to advance their own political, economic and cultural interests?  In 
order to answer question, I will investigate the connections between a mixture of formal and 
informal institutions, ranging from transnational non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such 
as the ICC and the legislative and legal institutions at both the federal and regional levels to 
smaller, local and regional NGOs such as the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the 
North (RAIPON) and the Yupik Eskimo Society of Chukotka (YESC). I will explore multi-
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institutional cooperation, paying particular attention to Canada’s influence on Yupiget as it 
pertains to Indigenous political development, and provide further comment to the wider debate 
regarding Arctic governance and cooperation. 
 In order to examine Yupiget political development, I will use an historical institutionalist 
approach, a widely accepted theoretical framework for the study of institutional change and 
stasis. Through an historical analysis of Indigenous institution building from the beginning of the 
Soviet Union though the post-Soviet transitional period to the contemporary Russian Federation, 
I will show how competing institutional structures have influenced the political, economic, and 
social development of Yupiget from the late Soviet period through to the present. 
Rationale 
 This research is timely and significant to Yupiget, and all Inuit, because massive global 
development pressures from external and internal sources are rapidly changing their Arctic 
homelands. This thesis will contribute to a western academic understanding of the challenges 
faced by Indigenous peoples of Siberia and the Russian Far East such as the Evenki (Fondahl, 
1998), and the Chukchi (Gray, 2004). The research will be useful for Arctic policy-makers and 
researchers alike as they attempt to understand the complexities of Inuit society and Indigenous 
politics in the circumpolar north. Findings from this research are relevant to a Canadian context 
because Yupiget are simultaneously members of the Russian nation-state and the circumpolar 
Inuit nation2, of which a considerable population reside in Canada. Furthermore, ICC Canada, in 
partnership with the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the former 
Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND) has played a leadership role 
in collecting financial resources to provide humanitarian and development aid to Yupiget and 																																																								
2 ‘Nation’ is used here not to mean a ‘nation-state’, rather a people with a shared territory, community, culture and 
history. See Alfred and Corntassel (2005: 608) for an Indigenous perspective of ‘nation’. 
	 5 
other Indigenous peoples from Siberia and the Far East following the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union (Slipchenko and Hannigan, 2010).  
 Issues related to Yupiget political development also exemplify one of the challenges 
shared across the circumpolar north and the world: self-determination for Indigenous peoples. 
With Canada’s very recent decision to fully support and sign onto the United Nations’ 
Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), the Canadian government is re-
imagining its relationship with Canada’s Indigenous peoples a full decade into UNDRIP’s 
implementation. Significantly lower social and economic indicators3 amongst Indigenous 
peoples in Canada and the entire Arctic underscore an urgent need to considerably raise their 
living standards. Moreover, significant resource development pressure from both industry and 
the federal government has perpetuated unequal relationships and strained Indigenous relations 
with the Crown, signaling a need to look beyond the historical and modern treaty process, 
towards forming new relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. By drawing 
on a key example of cooperative Arctic governance, I aim to broadly highlight the ways both 
state and non-state actors influence governance and policy direction in the Arctic.  
 Studies of Arctic governance have recently been conducted throughout the Canadian 
Arctic, many of which focus specifically on Canadian Inuit (Abele and Rodon, 2007, 2009; 
Shadian, 2006, 2007, 2010, 2013; Wilson and Smith, 2011; Wilson, 2007). As there is no 
evidence suggesting this type of research has been conducted in Chukotka, there is a clear 
opportunity to identify some key areas of future inquiry and ways in which this research can 
benefit not only northern researchers and policy-makers, but the people who live in Arctic 
regions. By examining Yupiget political development as a case study, further areas of study will 
																																																								
3 For an example, see Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (2014) “Social Determinants of Inuit Health in Canada” and Larson 
and Fondahl (2014) “Arctic Human Development Report II.” 
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be identified that may be mutually beneficial to Indigenous peoples and their respective states 
alike. 
Case Study: Yupiget 
 Yupiget are one of the smallest of the “small-numbered peoples”4 of the North, Siberia, 
and the Far East. Their population consists of approximately 1700 people (Rohr, 2014), settled 
mainly along the coast of the Chukchi Peninsula in the villages of New Chaplino, Uelkal, Uelen, 
Cape Schmidt, Sireniki, Provideniya, Lorino, and in the capital of Chukotka, Anadyr (Ainana, 
Zelensky and Bychkov, 2001). As a result of Soviet policies of collectivization and resettlement, 
along with fluctuating in/out-migrations of Russian settlers, Yupiget now largely reside outside 
of their ancestral territories in mixed Russian, Chukchi and Yupik settlements (Kertulla, 2000; 
Krupnik and Chlenov, 2007; Thompson, 2008). The Soviet era policy of collectivization 
removed Yupiget control over their traditional economic activities by relocating villages to 
support state farming industries and in order to better administer the region (Pelaudiex, 2012). 
 
																																																								
4 This unique term will be explained in greater detail on p. 20. 
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Fig. 1 Chukotka is the shaded region in the Northeast corner of the Russian Federation. Adapted from 
Wikipedia.org. Available at 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chukotka_Autonomous_Okrug#/media/File:Chukotka_in_Russia.svg 
 
 Yupiget continue to rely on sea mammal hunting as the foundation of their economic and 
subsistence activity (Borodin et al, 2002, 2012). Their traditional social, political and economic 
systems are centered on the hunting/gathering way of life and have persisted throughout the 
Soviet, transitional and the post-Soviet periods, albeit not without struggle and loss (Krupnik and 
Chlenov, 2013). As an Indigenous minority residing within the autonomous district of another 
Indigenous minority (the Chukchi), Yupiget face a constant struggle to preserve and reclaim 
their culture, language, and traditional livelihood while balancing the pressures of modernization 
and industrial development (Borodin et al., 2002; Sillanpää, 2005).   
 Traditional divisions of Yupiget include northern and southern territorial groups, divided 
into tribes and further divided into clans. These traditional divisions are no longer intact today 
because of early Soviet period resettlements, although some tribes remain together in certain 
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national villages5 in Chukotka (Schindler, 1996). The Soviet period completely changed how 
Yupiget conducted their economic activities and trade relationships (Abryutina, 2007). Soviet 
industrial development policies were largely unconcerned with the effects of development on 
Yupiget (Sillanpää, 2005). After the Soviet Union’s dissolution, they were left extremely 
isolated, without many supplies and goods provided by the state, and were economically 
dependent almost solely on sea mammal hunting (Abryuntina, 2007). There were also shifts in 
the balance of power between federal and regional authorities in Russia, signaling changes in 
decision-making and the enforcement of legislation from the center to the regions throughout the 
1990s (Gray, 2005) and more recently back to the center (Sharafutdinova, 2013; Staalesen, 
2014).  
 In 1990, just prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Chukotka successfully seceded 
from Magadan Republic (Gray, 2005; Thompson, 2008) perhaps leading the way for more 
regional autonomy within the new Okrug. As authority became more decentralized in the Soviet 
Union a small window of opportunity arose for the promotion of Indigenous rights and 
Indigenous participation at the regional and federal levels of government. Soviet leader Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) were perceived as 
promoting regional autonomy (Roeder, 1991; Semenova, 2007). The 1990s were a time of 
increasing awareness of Indigenous rights (Pika, 1999). During this time, Yupiget became 
politically active, both at home and abroad. The federal government enacted laws meant to 
protect and empower Indigenous minorities (Ainana, Zelensky and Bychkov, 2001; Diatchkova, 
2010; Gray, 2001; Krupkik and Vakhtin, 2002; Pelaudiex, 2012; Schindler, 1992; Sillanpää, 
2005). However, the regional government’s statutes were rarely in line with federal legislation, 
resulting in conflicting interpretations of statutes and difficulties with the implementation of the 																																																								
5 A settlement based on ethnicity. 
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law (Gray, 2005). The legal status of Yupiget has never been determined in Chukotka (Sillanpää, 
2005). Because of their small population and geographical location, Yupiget are administratively 
subordinated to the Chukchi, the larger Indigenous group to which a de jure type of formal 
political autonomy had, at least in name, been granted with the formation of the Chukotka 
Autonomous Okrug in the 1930s.  
 Yupiget are far more geographically distant from Moscow than any other Indigenous 
peoples of the USSR and its successor, the Russian Federation. This isolation6, not only from the 
federal administration but also from the administration in Chukotka’s capital Anadyr, greatly 
affects the quality of infrastructure and services provided by the state to Yupiget (Gray, 2005). 
The main form of transportation is air travel as there are few roads connecting villages except for 
in the winter when ice roads on frozen rivers are utilized for ground travel (Ibid). Because 
Yupiget villages are located in high Arctic, near the Bering Strait, the ocean shipping season is 
short and often unreliable. Most of the transportation infrastructure provided by the state is from 
the Soviet period, and supports industrial development such as oil and gas extraction and mining 
operations (Krupnik and Vakhtin, 2002). However, former Governor Roman Abramovich (2001-
08) invested in the major centers in Chukotka, building and repairing roads, hospitals and 
schools (Thompson, 2008).  
 In the 1990s, the basic support provided by the state collapsed with the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, and a period of massive out-migration ensued, effectively removing over half the 
(settler) population (Gray, 2001; 2005; Thompson, 2002). Communications were unstable and 
worked intermittently, and services were limited by reduced access to villages and former 
settlements (Hurst, 2011). The lack of services created a state of emergency for Yupiget. In the 
late 1990s, Red Cross Canada and ICC Canada met with YESC to distribute humanitarian aid in 																																																								
6 See Figure 2. 
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the Provideniya region (Ainana, Zelensky and Bychkov, 2001; Wilson, 2007).  
 Yupiget constitute the majority ethnicity in only two settlements: New Chaplino and 
Sireniki (Robert-Lamblin, 1993). The current state of infrastructure in Yupik villages today is 
unclear. As noted above, Abramovich’s modernization projects were concentrated in the urban 
centers, and mainly in Anadyr. That is not to say the villages received nothing, just that it is 
under-reported. It is, however, likely that services such as power generation, roads and 
transportation, as well as other government provided services are still more determined by the 
needs of the resource extraction industry and the major centers than the needs of ordinary 
citizens in remote communities.  
 The consolidation and resettlement of Yupik villages played a key role in determining the 
rights of Yupiget as an Indigenous minority in the Russian Federation and the prospects for 
meaningful representation in local political institutions. Also, the formation of and interruptions 
in the operation of local NGOs provide key insights into the future political development of 
Yupiget. Lastly, competing federal and regional law-making regimes are complicating the ability 
of Yupiget to exercise control over their domestic affairs, while their involvement with the ICC 
and Arctic Council allow them to participate in broader Arctic governance and international 
cooperation. Their involvement with, and the assistance of, the international community provides 
the only support for their autonomy and internationally recognized inherent Indigenous rights. A 
thorough examination of the seemingly competing institutional arrangements of the ICC and the 
Russian Federation will provide insight as to why Yupiget are increasingly politically isolated at 
home and abroad. 
Conceptual Clarity 
 Before proceeding to the methods chapter, it is necessary to try to define some of the 
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concepts that are used in this study. The purpose of this section is to highlight the terminology 
used in this research by presenting them in the wider academic context to determine working 
definitions that can be used to analyze this case study. This section also establishes the 
assumptive basis by which the research question will be answered. For example, it is assumed 
that Yupiget collectively want to achieve some degree of political autonomy in order to 
“preserve their culture, language and traditional way of life” (Ainana, 2001).  
Autonomy 
 Autonomy is etymologically founded in the Greek words autos – self, and nomos – rule 
of law (Bruce and Gilio-Whitaker. 2014; Loukacheva, 2005). It broadly translates to “ruling 
oneself.” Academics, nation-states, and international law interpret autonomy in slightly different 
ways. In order to establish a working definition of “political autonomy,” academic, legal, and 
Russian interpretations will be given consideration and connections drawn between them. 
 At its broadest, with reference to Indigenous peoples, political autonomy is “the right to 
be different and to be left alone; to preserve, protect and promote values which are beyond the 
legitimate reach of the rest of society” (Hannum, 1990: 4). Scholars have refined political 
autonomy into three, somewhat distinct categories: personal autonomy – granted to all members 
of a minority regardless of whether or not they belong to a specific territorial administrative unit; 
territorial autonomy - institutionalized division of powers between the autonomous territory and 
the central authorities; functional autonomy - the devolution of specific powers pertaining to 
culture, education, religion or media to Indigenous or minority organizations (Åkermark, 2013; 
Musafiri, 2012). Musafiri (2012) notes that acquiring adequate resources is a critical prerequisite 
to the ‘effective functioning’ of all three forms of autonomy. A specific commonality between 
these forms of autonomy is the establishment of regional or local institutions to connect political 
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activity with the members of the autonomous group or organization (Ibid). Åkermark (2013) 
adds that the window of opportunity for the ‘successful introduction of an autonomous solution’ 
is most likely to occur during a period of crisis or political upheaval. 
 Other scholars distinguish between non-territorial and territorial autonomy in a very 
broad manner, explicating notions such as “cultural autonomy,” “personal autonomy,” 
“exterritorial autonomy,” “corporate autonomy” and “segmental autonomy,” often using the term 
self-government interchangeably with autonomy (Osipov, 2010).  Following the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union, two distinct, but related, processes to achieving regional or territorial 
autonomy arose: the negotiated bilateral treaty process between the federal and regional 
governments; and, the de facto process whereby the central authorities had defaulted on their 
responsibilities to the regions (Stoner-Weiss, 1999).  
 The federal law On National-Cultural Autonomy [No. 74-FL of June 17, 1996, as 
amended on June 29, 2004] that protects the cultural development of Russia’s many national 
minorities was an early legal protection for Indigenous minorities in the Russian Federation. 
However the weak federal government lacked the capacity to enforce and implement it in the 
regions. The state’s inability to implement legislation in the regions is an example of ‘the 
weakness of de facto autonomy. National cultural autonomy does not necessarily equate to 
political autonomy, and de facto autonomy does not exactly ensure territorial autonomy. As 
protections, however, they are both symbolic of the historical development of Russia’s 
Indigenous minorities. Additionally, national cultural autonomy constitutes a two dimensional 
definition: “the first refers to a general principle by which individuals use various institutional 
formats to collectively pursue their rights and interests related to their ethnic origin, language, 
and culture” such as legislation. The second meaning refers to “a specific form of ethnicity-based 
organization” such as an ethnic-based NGO (Osipov, 2010: 36). 
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 The federal law On National-Cultural Autonomy [No. 74-FL of June 17, 1996, as 
amended on June 29, 2004] chapter 1, article 1, offers this definition:  
The national-cultural autonomy in the Russian Federation is the form of the national-
cultural self-determination which is the social association of citizens of the Russian 
Federation who consider themselves to belong to certain ethnic communities on the basis 
of their voluntary self-organization with the aim of the independent solution of the issues 
related to preservation of their identity, development of language, education, and national 
culture. 
 National-cultural autonomy, as opposed to a territorial autonomous arrangement, is the preferred 
instrument for resolving minority rights by Russian authorities because there are almost always 
other minorities residing within the autonomous territories of a “titular7” minority (Bowering, 
2012). Osipov (2010), however, notes that national cultural autonomy is more symbolic than 
instrumental in its application. While there are consistent principles embedded within the law, 
there is too much disjuncture between it and other federal and regional legislation to implement 
it fully (Ibid).  
 The failure to implement such legislation has important implications for those groups 
seeking a degree of autonomy. First, while non-territorial autonomy is defined in Russian law, it 
might be as important to understand what it does, in addition to what it is (Åkermark, 2013). 
Autonomous arrangements institutionalize relationships between the central authorities and the 
minority, and place new requirements and expectations upon them both (Ibid). Additionally, 
there are legal implications, both domestically and internationally, from failing to implement 
																																																								
7 “Titular” nationalities are those that were granted a territory in the Soviet period (Prina, 2014). In this case, 
Chukchi are the “titular” minority granted territorial autonomy via the Chukchi Autonomous Okrug. Smaller 
Indigenous groups within Chukotka, such as Yupiget, are not granted territorial rights and privileges. Yupiget are 
granted cultural autonomy in that language, tradition and cultural identity are/can be protected by law. 
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laws that are developed around the “rights” discourse. While autonomy is ill defined in terms of 
international legal discourse, there are some points of discussion relevant to this study. 
 In international law, autonomy is a function of the rights of participation and self-
determination (Xanthaki, 2004). Through this state-centric view, autonomy is permitted to 
Indigenous peoples through the development of various non-binding international agreements 
such as the 1991 Nuuk Conclusions and Recommendations on Indigenous Autonomy and Self-
Government and further in the 2007 UNDRIP. Loukacheva (2005: 14) demonstrates how the 
Nuuk Conclusions outline three important components of Indigenous autonomy: Article 2 states 
“the inherent and fundamental right to autonomy and self-government,” while Article 4 adds that 
“self-government, self-administration and self-management of Indigenous peoples constitute 
elements of political autonomy,” and further specifies that “the realization of this right should 
not pose a threat to the territorial integrity of the State.”  
UNDRIP (2007: 4-5) goes even further in codifying autonomy as an Indigenous right. Article 
4 states: “Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to 
autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as 
ways and means for financing their autonomous functions.” UNDRIP (2007: 20) equates 
Indigenous political autonomy with internal self-determination and outlines the following 
characteristics of an autonomous arrangement: 
• “A strong voluntary will of the population to achieve autonomy; 
• Existence of particular geographical, demographic or historical factors; 
• Cultural, linguistic, ethnic distinctiveness; 
• Creation of a legislative body elected by local residents in a democratic way and 
capable to enact its own legislation; as well as the establishment of an executive body; 
• Provisions of conditions for economic sustainability and a financial base versus fiscal 
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dependency on central/federal authorities and pragmatic expectations of future 
financial independence and liability for managing its own affairs; and, 
• Autonomy starts with “self,” the desire and ability of all residents of the autonomous 
entity to be a part of existing or building structures and institutions, making them more 
amenable to peoples’ aspirations and needs.”  
Significant factors include a cultural aspect, the ability to self-identify and to be accepted by the 
group to which one identifies, an historical aspect, the capacity to act, and a governance and 
institution-building regime, all of which are characteristic of the process of self-determination. 
Self-Determination 
 If autonomy is an endgame or a result, then self-determination is the process by which 
autonomy is realized (Bruce and Gilio-Whitaker, 2014). The very notion of Indigenous self-
determination is founded on the principle of “equal freedom from rule,” which is not sufficiently 
protected by former colonial powers inside settler states (Volmert, 2010: 53). Humphrey [1984] 
describes self-determination as “the proposition that every People should freely determine its 
own political status and freely pursue its economic, social, and cultural development” (in 
Hannum, 1990: 27). Russian Indigenous leaders have extended such definitions to include:  
Freedom from political and economic domination by others; the right to their own 
governments and laws; free and agreed-upon political and legal relations with the 
government of their country; control over economic developments and their cultural, 
linguistic, and spiritual life; the right to participate in the international community; and the 
right to own and govern their own territories and lands (Rethmann, 2001: 2).  
Thus, there are a variety of outcomes of self-determination including rights protections, cultural, 
economic, and/or political autonomy, and even independent statehood. Halperin, Scheffer, and 
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Small (1992: 47) describe self-determination as “entitling its people to choose its political 
allegiance, to influence the political order in which it lives, and to preserve its cultural, ethnic, 
historical, or territorial identity.” The aforementioned definitions construct an internal/external 
self-determination dichotomy regarding self-determination: internal self-determination amounts 
to collective political autonomy, while external self-determination can equate to political 
independence. 
  Anaya (1996) offers a framework more appropriate for an institutionalist perspective in 
his seminal work Indigenous Peoples in International Law. To account for the “multiple human 
associational patterns in today’s world,” Anaya distinguishes between constitutive and ongoing 
self-determination (Anaya, 1996: 81). Constitutive self-determination refers to the establishment, 
merger and/or changes to the scope of authority of an institution. Self-determination requires that 
these processes are guided by the will of the people - those subordinate to the institution. 
Ongoing self-determination refers to the maintenance and upkeep of the current institutional 
order and requires that the people are free to live and develop as they choose. Anaya’s (1996) 
framework closely mirrors the theory of historical institutionalism that is explained more 
thoroughly in the following chapter. 
 Self-determination is “universal in its scope,” requiring collective rights and “particular 
in its articulation,” requiring elements of localized, territorial, and cultural control over specific 
resources (Muehlebach. 2003: 261). Murphy (2008: 200) describes how the relational model of 
self-determination adds an important element to the notion of ongoing self-determination: 
“Autonomous institutions of self-government may be the most obvious route to Indigenous 
empowerment, but Indigenous representatives may also need an effective voice in local, 
regional, and national institutions that have the capacity to influence their individual and 
collective futures.”  A relational model allows for “multiple points of access to political power 
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and decision-making” (Ibid). While “institutions of self-government” may or may not be the 
right delivery mechanism for Indigenous political autonomy, increased Indigenous participation 
in the governing institutions of the state can enhance the constitutive component of self-
determination.  
Indigeneity 
 The term “Indigenous peoples” is used throughout this thesis to refer to First Nations, 
Aboriginal peoples, Native peoples, Indian peoples, Tribal peoples, etc. and any other commonly 
used moniker to refer to Indigenous peoples around the circumpolar north. There are two distinct 
definitions of “Indigenous” that distinguish between Indigenous peoples in Russia and the rest of 
the world. One particularly eloquent definition maintains:  
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical 
continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, 
consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing on those 
territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are 
determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral 
territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in 
accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal system… On an 
individual basis, an indigenous person is one who belongs to these indigenous populations 
through self-identification as indigenous (group consciousness) and is recognized and 
accepted by these populations as one of its members (acceptance by the group) (UN 
Indigenous Study in Hannum, 1990: 89). 
The key elements of this definition include a common history, traditional use of a defined 
territory and the ability to transmit knowledge of/from the territory to future generations, 
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minority status, self-identification and acceptance by other members.  
 In contrast, and due in part to perceived and/or real differences in its colonial history, the 
Russian definition differs in scope and context. The Russian concept of “Indigenous” was 
formalized in 1993 with the drafting of the first Constitution of the Russian Federation 
(Stammler-Gosman, 2009). Indigenous small-numbered peoples (korennye malochislennye 
narody) of the Russian Federation are defined in Russian law as peoples residing within the 
ancestral territories of a traditional settlement, preserving a traditional way of life and 
maintaining a traditional economic system and activities, consisting of fewer than 50,000 
individuals, and identifying as independent ethnic communities (Donahoe et al., 2008; 
Stammler-Gossmann, 2009). The Russian definition allows for a variety of interpretations of 
concepts such as “traditional economic system” and “traditional way of life”8 and sets limits to 
the population of an Indigenous group. This may have serious implications on any discussion of 
Indigenous rights as they pertain to Russian citizens on Russian soil.  
Philosophical Underpinnings of the Argument 
 Because there is no clear way to garner the current perspectives of Yupiget, and their 
voices are largely missing from this thesis, some assumptions will be made in order to keep this 
thesis focused and functional. Beginning with the universality of rights in the international 
discourse, it is reasonable to assume that Yupiget would like to exercise their collective rights to 
autonomy. It is also reasonable to assume that they are satisfied to be both Russian citizens, and 
members of the circumpolar Inuit community, given their participation in ICC. The development 
of a number of organizations in the 1990s that Yupiget and other Russian Indigenous peoples use 
to engage in issues pertinent to their lives illustrates the amount of discontent with the old regime 
																																																								
8 The concept of “traditional” is still undefined in legal terms. 
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and the status quo. While the contemporary political climate in Russia is less favourable to 
resolving the challenges of exercising Indigenous rights, the existence of Indigenous activism 
inside and outside the Russian Federation demonstrates the commitment of Russian Indigenous 
peoples to their own political development.  
 The data contained in this thesis are analyzed through a social constructivist paradigm. 
Additionally, this thesis is written using a phenomenological understanding of human 
interaction. To clarify, human experience dictates our understanding of the world. For example, 
in the dominant Canadian culture, we understand governance as a function of government - it is 
what the government does. However, in certain Indigenous cultures, government was non-
existent, but there was governance.  Therefore, as previously stated with reference to Murphy’s 
(2008) notion of relational self-determination, self-government may not be the most appropriate 
vehicle for political autonomy. UNDRIP Article 3 identifies “self-government, self-
administration and self-management” as the constitutive elements of political autonomy (UN 
General Assembly, 2007). If a people has never before had to structure a “self-government” and 
the settler state builds the model (i.e. band council), it is inappropriate to label this arrangement 
“political autonomy,” especially when an Indigenous perspective is under-valued or not valued at 
all by the dominant culture. The last assumption is that one individual, organization or institution 
does not represent the views of every member of the group. Where it is possible to find 
dissenting viewpoints, they will be presented. In this thesis, I aim to develop a rather broad 
analysis of Yupiget political development using a generalizable conception of political 
autonomy.  
Overview of Chapters 
  In this chapter, I described the rationale, research question and case study under 
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examination. I also described the epistemological assumptions in my approach to the research for 
this thesis. I ended the chapter by defining some of the key terminology including “self-
determination” and “political autonomy.” In Chapter 2, I will begin by outlining the theoretical 
framework of historical institutionalism and how it will be used to guide my inquiry and frame 
my argument. Next I will explain the data and methods used to collect and analyze data in order 
to complete this thesis. I will also explain some of the challenges presented while planning this 
thesis research and how they were resolved. In the following three chapters, I will highlight the 
institutional development of Indigenous peoples in the Russian Federation and, more 
specifically, Yupiget over three distinct time periods. This temporal break down is used to 
illustrate the waxing and waning of state influence over Yupiget institutional development. 
Chapter 3 examines the Soviet period where Yupiget institutions were replaced by state 
institutions. Chapter 4 explores the transitional period where Soviet institutions, in some ways, 
immediately evaporated and a range of new institutional possibilities thrived in the vacuum left 
by the removal of state control. Chapter 5 looks at the contemporary period, where the 
centralizing force of the state regained influence over the regions and sought more control over 
the emerging institutions of Russian civil society. Each chapter is divided into thematic sections 
consisting of: political developments at the federal and local levels, including civil society and 
Indigenous activism in the latter two chapters; and, international cooperation and particularly the 
effect of Canada’s bilateral relationship with the Russian Federation in the Arctic on Yupiget 
political development. In Chapter 6, I will use the tools of historical institutionalism to explain 
the historical evolution and current state of Yupiget political autonomy and self-determination. 
In the concluding chapter, I will summarize my argument and also highlight gaps in our 
knowledge, the limitations of the study, and outline some next steps in terms of future research 
concerned with Yupiget political autonomy.  
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Chapter 2: Theory and Methods 
 Theory is used to connect research to present knowledge, permit its critical evaluation 
and help a researcher decide on the most relevant research methods. It also allows the researcher 
to move past basic descriptions of particular phenomena, and to generalize, and place limits on 
such generalizations, about their research. In this chapter, I will begin by describing historical 
institutionalism, a theoretical framework used in this case to explain and understand the 
development and subsequent stasis of Yupiget political autonomy.  In part one, I will explain 
how historical institutionalism will be used, its arguments and assumptions, strengths and 
weaknesses, and finally its efficacy in relation to other types of institutional theory. In part two, I 
will describe how the data used in this thesis were collected and share some of the challenges 
that occurred during the data collection process, including ethical concerns, recruiting 
participants, and the effect of global politics on research opportunities. 
 Historical Institutionalism 
   Institutional theory has a long history in the discipline of political science. It initially 
grew out of an approach used by organizational theorists in the mid-19th century, and prior to the 
behaviouralist revolution, it focused narrowly on the study of laws and constitutionalism. In the 
1980s, neo-institutionalists sought out answers to political phenomena that were poorly 
explained by behaviouralist theory that dominated political science in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Institutionalists understand political change and, more so, stability as a result of institutionalized 
practices, not just the rational, self-interested behaviour of political actors. They also have a 
broader definition of what constitutes an institution than their predecessors of the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries. Three distinct varieties of institutionalism stemmed from this development: 
rational choice, sociological and historical. While sharing a basic premise, these streams of 
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institutionalism are responses to multiple perspectives of individuals and institutions. 
 Institutionalism enhances our understanding of political action by describing the 
relationship between institutions and the behaviour of actors.  Rational choice institutionalism 
assumes the primacy of individuals in relation to institutions and asks where institutions come 
from, whereas historical institutionalists and sociological institutionalists, to a degree, assume 
the primacy of institutions and examine how they affect individuals’ behaviour (Thelen, 1999). 
Both the historical and sociological variants of institutionalism reject the functionalist 
assumption found in rational choice institutionalism that institutions exist to serve a specific 
purpose. Particularly with reference to Indigenous political development, Poelzer (1996: 7) urges 
the rejection of functionalist assumptions because they are “ahistorical” and assume that 
institutions develop in response to a priori “needs” rather than “their own historically 
conditioned logic of political development.” Rational choice scholars take preferences for 
granted, looking specifically to a moment in time as the context in which individuals make 
interest-maximizing decisions, while historical institutionalists are concerned with how the ideas, 
roles, and interests create preferences that advance over time (Sanders, 2008). 
 Historical institutionalism is a suitable theoretical framework and applicable to this 
research for two reasons.  First, there is evidence that the structural and ideological institutions 
established within the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation have and continue to directly 
affect the contemporary political organization of Yupiget (Gray, 2001; Krupnik and Vakhtin, 
2002; Thompson, 2008). As demonstrated in Thelen’s (1999: 369) work “institutions emerge 
from and are embedded in concrete temporal processes.” Second, institutional norms established 
by state authorities during the Soviet and post-Soviet periods have impacted Russia’s Indigenous 
peoples and continue to do so today (Diatchkova 2001; Koivurova, 2010; Riekkinen, 2011).  
Furthermore, increasing international cooperation near the end of the 20th century increased the 
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visibility of Yupiget and other Indigenous peoples’ challenges to global audiences and a range of 
institutions have been established to help resolve them.  
 Historical institutionalism developed, in part, to explain variation in cases (Steinmo, 
2014). Institutionalists are concerned with the entire range of state and societal institutions that 
influence the interests of political actors, and the configuration of power relations between them 
(Thelen & Steinmo, 1992). In particular, historical institutionalists are interested in the 
construction, maintenance and adaptation of institutions (Sanders, 2008). From a broad historical 
institutionalist perspective, institutions include the “formal and informal procedures, routines, 
norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political 
economy” (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 6-7). Suddaby, Foster and Mills (2014: 111) offer a more 
nuanced definition: “the socio-historical process by which habituated actions and meanings 
become reified as objective social structures.”   
 Steinmo (2008: 159) offers an articulate, though rather vague definition: an institution is 
“rules.” Whether formal or informal, rules are a necessary but insufficient factor in explaining 
the collective behaviour of political actors. Peters, Pierre & King (2005: 1286) note a dualist 
interpretation of ‘institution’ as “refer[ring] alternatively to deliberately created institutions 
charged with the implementation of public policy, and the formal rules structuring relations 
between the state and interest groups.” The dualist interpretation is useful in distinguishing 
between the institutions of the Russian state, such as different branches of government, and the 
rules that dictate interactions between interest groups and the institutions of the state such as 
legislation and convention. Within these definitions is a space to explore how informal rules, 
such as norms, values, and beliefs, interact with formal rules such as legislative procedures, over 
time to influence the behaviour of political actors within the institutions of the state, and how the 
over-reaching, inflexible institutional structure of Russia’s political system prevents Yupiget 
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from realizing political autonomy. 
 Historical institutionalism emphasizes power asymmetries among political actors, and 
examines connections between institutions and other variables such as socio-economic change, 
ideological flows, and the interests and strategies of political actors, thus locating institutions 
within a larger context. It also tends to be inspired by “big” and “real world” questions (Shu-Yun 
Ma, 2007).  Keohane [1989] suggests “institutions define limits and set choices on actor 
behavior in both formal and informal ways,” and within economic, political, and social settings 
(Higgot, 2008: 611).  Rather than exploring political actors’ interests in terms of “maximization” 
or “rule following,” historical institutionalists are more likely to explain “human motivation in 
terms of goals – which have a more public, less self-interested dimension – and in collective 
action, whether among executive officials, legislators, or social groups” (Sanders, 2008: 42). 
Historical institutionalists suggest that collective institutional preferences are formed by the level 
of investment in present and past designs, specifically when they are the cause of “increasing 
returns” and “positive externalities” (Fioretos, 2011: 384). Individuals may act in ways contrary 
to their own self-interest, because the rules dictate a particular course of action. While historical 
institutionalists do not reject the effect of individual preference on political outcomes, they seek 
to explain political outcomes by examining the ways institutions regulate the behaviour of 
individual actors (Hall and Taylor, 1996).  
 Within the scope of this thesis research, historical institutionalism will help to provide 
insight as to how relationships between institutions are formed and maintained, and how the 
rules “shape who participates in a given decision and, simultaneously, their strategic behavior” 
(Steinmo, 2008: 159). In fact, institutions are inherently resistant to reform because they dictate 
the very rules and mechanisms by which redesign is possible (Hall and Taylor, 1996). The 
definitions and underlying assumptions associated with historical institutionalism form the 
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theoretical basis of this proposed research: Yupiget political development is directly affected by 
the formal and informal rules by which the state and civil society in Russia are allowed to 
operate. Such rules not only dictate Yupiget level of participation in domestic political 
organizations, but also their participation in international political organizations too. 
 Two of the key concepts in historical institutionalism are the “critical juncture” 
(Capoccia & Keleman, 2007; Steinmo, 2008; Thelen, 1999) and the resulting “path dependency” 
(Fioretos, 2011; Peters, Pierre & King, 2005; Steinmo, 2008; Thelen, 1999). A critical juncture is 
an abrupt change in the institutional context or rules that opens up a different path. When an 
institution is at a critical juncture, it embarks down a path where it becomes increasingly more 
difficult to return to the previous path. An example of a critical juncture is the establishment of 
the Soviet Union, or perhaps more recently, the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Both of these 
events changed the development path of the Yupiget, in the process exposing them to different 
political systems and different institutional contexts. The assumptions regarding critical junctures 
and path dependency, respectively, are as such:  
The first involves arguments about crucial founding moments of institutional formation 
that send countries along broadly different developmental paths; the second suggests that 
institutions continue to evolve in response to changing environmental conditions and 
ongoing political maneuvering but in ways that are constrained by past trajectories 
(Thelen, 1999: 387).   
Institutional stability is explained by periods of “punctuated equilibrium” whereby a critical 
juncture disturbs the normal functioning of an institution or set of institutions, setting the 
institution along a different path and making the return to the previous path or status quo much 
more difficult. The causal logic supporting the premise is that choices made during a critical 
juncture will reject alternative options leading to the establishment of “institutions that generate 
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self-reinforcing path-dependent processes” (Cappocia & Keleman, 2007: 341).  
 Problems in aligning federal and regional legislation and the dispersal of power 
throughout state and non-state institutions can be addressed through careful consideration of both 
critical junctures and path dependency and their interdependencies. Historical institutionalism is 
well equipped to support this research by explaining the institutional evolution of the Russian 
Far East and examining the effects of critical junctures and the resulting path dependency on 
Yupiget. 
 The strength of historical institutionalism with regards to this research is its emphasis on 
a temporal aspect.  While the rational and sociological institutional approaches pay less attention 
to the significance of time, and more to the concept of human agency, historical institutionalism 
is concerned with longevity. That is not to say that historical institutionalists disregard the notion 
of human agency within institutional formation and structure. Rather, they assert that different 
institutionalist approaches make different assumptions regarding the nature of human agency 
(Fioretos, 2005; Steinmo, 2008). Campbell (2012) argues that the “nature of governance” is not 
only defined by its demand or societal function, but by the legacy of past policy decisions. The 
temporal aspect of historical institutionalism will add depth in explaining and situating future 
findings, shedding light on how and why certain Soviet and Russian institutions have maintained 
specific trajectories for long periods of time, and how the formation of new institutions such as 
Indigenous advocacy and self-governments9 (local government) are restrained by both the ever-
evolving structure of the state and Russian political culture. 
 Criticisms of historical institutionalism condemn its narrow view of the causes of change 
outside of periods of stability and periods of quick change (Peters, Pierre & King, 2005).  In 																																																								
9 The term ‘self-government’ in Russia describes local administrations. It is roughly equivalent to a Canadian 
municipal government. Perhaps the closest analog to the Canadian conception of First Nation self-governments in 
Russia is the “Suktul” for Yukaghirs in Sakha Republic (See Derlicki, 2010). 
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addition, critics cite its limited explanatory power and inability to predict potential outcomes of 
specific change as downfalls (Ibid). Béland (2009) identifies three explanatory gaps in historical 
institutionalism with regards to policy-making: first, it says very little about the agenda-setting 
and how certain issues become part of the policy process; second, it is better at explaining policy 
in terms of constraints and opportunities rather than how certain policy choices manifest 
themselves within the institutional structure; and third, policy choices are affected by more than 
past legacies but by the strategies used to convey a political message regarding policy 
alternatives. Peters, Pierre and King (2005) agree with the first gap that historical institutionalism 
may well describe the persistence of a certain path, but is less successful at explaining how the 
path was originally selected. Analyses designed to explain such persistence have a tendency to 
overemphasize the rigidity of institutions (Hall, 2009).  
 Despite these suggested shortcomings, historical institutionalism remains the most 
appropriate theoretical framework for this research because of its focus on the dynamic nature of 
political autonomy and how it manifests over time. There have been no previous attempts to 
apply this theory to this particular case study, or in the study of Indigenous self-determination 
more generally. Such studies tend to focus on normative questions that justify granting 
Indigenous peoples autonomy or self-determination rather than explaining how political 
autonomy and self-determination occur and are maintained. 
Research Methods 
 This study is based on a variety of qualitative methods including in-depth interviews and 
document and narrative analyses. Key informant interviews are the principal method of primary 
data collection. Interviews were formatted as semi-structured, utilizing both primary and 
secondary questions in order to allow for flexibility and a two-way exchange while staying 
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focused on the topic (Dunn, 2010). A secondary analysis, or data mining technique, is used to 
add context and depth to the key informant interviews and will be explained in more detail in the 
following paragraphs. Data were organized into two concept maps10 to guide the analysis and to 
provide a visual aid with which to establish connections between the institutions and actors that 
are the subject of this inquiry. 
Data Collection 
 Secondary data sources accessed for this study include books, technical reports, scholarly 
journal articles, relevant online newspaper articles, and websites. In just about every case, the 
language of publication was English. Where Russian language materials were selected, the 
author, who has an elementary understanding of Russian language, conducted the translations. 
Data were selected subjectively by their relevance to Yupiget, and cover a wide array of topics 
including ethnographies, political, social and economic development, law and legislation.  
Information was also collected regarding Chukotka, particularly society and culture in Chukotka 
before examining the Indigenous rights movement in Russia and its effect on Indigenous groups 
within Chukotka and Russia more broadly. Next, data on transnational Inuit political 
organization with relevance to Yupiget was collected in order to understand the dual identity 
maintained by Yupiget and its effect on their political development– they are simultaneously 
Russian citizens and kin to Inuit from across the circumpolar north. Online newspapers from the 
arctic regions are used to account for the historical record and present the “facts” as portrayed by 
their respective authors.  
 There is very little scholarly research in political science regarding the political 
development of Yupiget and so disciplines such as anthropology, ethnography, and geography 
																																																								
10 See Appendices 1 and 2. 
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were instrumental in formulating the author’s understanding of the political development of 
Yupiget, and also all Indigenous peoples of Russia. The data generated from the documentary 
analysis were used to create a timeline of events. This timeline was utilized in later chapters to 
create a narrative and then guide the task of producing an historical analysis.  
 The challenges of collecting data range from the obvious, such as language barriers with, 
and access to, Russian language materials, to the more complex, such as domestic and 
international developments that complicated the research process. The original proposal for this 
thesis included a trip to Chukotka to conduct interviews with Yupiget community members and 
local government leaders. Shortly after the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 
2014, Chukotka was designated a strategic military zone by Russian authorities, and travel to 
Chukotka became difficult to arrange. As western economic sanctions against Russian 
individuals and businesses started taking effect, the chances of going to Chukotka, and the 
likelihood of collecting the data required for the original research proposal, decreased. Under the 
advice of Igor Krupnik, a renowned Russian researcher with decades of experience researching 
in Chukotka, and with the guidance of my thesis supervisor, the thesis was first refocused to gain 
insight from the perspectives of the international Inuit community. Inuit from Canada and Alaska 
played a considerable role in providing humanitarian assistance and joint scientific research 
exchanges with Yupiget and other indigenous Russians. While they could not provide a first-
hand account of life as a Russian Yupik, they would be able to provide an account of Inuit 
institution building while working closely with their Russian kin. 
 While I began to try organizing interviews with members of ICC Canada and ICC 
Alaska, the Russian authorities started passing laws to put pressure on Russian non-
governmental organizations with foreign funding and connections. Amendments in 2014 to what 
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is colloquially known as the Foreign Agents Law11 will be described further, but for now, the 
significance to this research is that it is plausibly a contributing factor to why communications 
with both ICC Canada and ICC Alaska stopped. Both organizations were interested in taking part 
in the research, and I did attempt to build a relationship with these organizations. However, 
without reason, communications ceased. I am assuming that the tightening of the Foreign Agents 
Law made it more difficult for ICC to fulfill its mandate, and participating in this research would 
only make it more difficult. Therefore, under the advice of my supervisor, I made the decision to 
conduct interviews with Canadian bureaucrats and technical specialists that were, or are 
currently involved in bilateral or multilateral cooperation with Indigenous peoples and 
organizations in northern Russia and, more specifically, Chukotka in the 1990s and 2000s.  
 This thesis sustained another major modification and again was refocused to provide an 
historical analysis of the institutional constraints and opportunities that have influenced Yupiget 
self-determination.  Therefore, a significant part of the data collection focused on Yupiget 
interactions with international organizations and Canadian international assistance to Chukotka 
and Russia and includes the perspectives of Canadian government officials who worked in 
Chukotka during the period of humanitarian crisis following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
The addition of sections on Canada’s bilateral engagement with the Soviet Union and Russian 
Federation offers contextual data about Yupiget and other Indigenous peoples of the Russian Far 
East.  
Ethical Considerations 
 As with all research involving humans, certain ethical considerations are taken into 
account throughout the research design, and during the data collection and analysis stages of the 
																																																								
11 Russian Federation Federal Law No. 121, July 20, 2012. 
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research process. This research has been conducted following the guidelines of TCPS 2 - Tri-
Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans, upon completion of 
the TCPS 2 Course on Research Ethics. More importantly, this research complies with the 
Association of Canadian Universities for Northern Studies (2003) Ethical Principles for the 
Conduct of Research in the North. Prior to initiating contact with interview participants, this 
research underwent an ethics review by the University of Northern British Columbia’s Research 
Ethics Board. It is important to approach potential ethical dilemmas from every stage of the 
research process including the planning, data collection, analysis and presentation (Dowling, 
2010).  
 Another consideration regarding the planned fieldwork in Chukotka was that a trip to 
Chukotka is very costly. Moreover, while there was a window of time where travel to Chukotka 
was a possibility, there was a high likelihood that data collected would not represent the true 
perspective of participants, but instead mimic the official state perspective, especially in light of 
the restrictions placed on individuals representing NGOs and Indigenous organizations. 
Therefore, the data collected for this project did not include recent first-hand accounts of 
Yupiget.  
Interviews 
 A direct interview of key witnesses is the only way to learn about certain events or 
phenomena (Johnson & Joslyn, 1995). According to Kirby and McKenna (1989: 66-68), there 
are four “essential components” of an interview:  
The formation and clarity of questions, egalitarian relationship between the interviewer and 
the participant, identification of your research approach to the research participant at first 
contact, and the interview is an instrument of data collection, but also the sharing of ideas 
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and philosophy and experiences and symbolic expressions. 
Each of these four components guided the development of the interview questions and the 
general conduct of the interviews. Key informant interviews are a popular data collection method 
among political scientists who “study political behavior inside and outside political institutions” 
(Vromen, 2010: 158). The interviews produced rich, firsthand knowledge that encompasses a 
wide range of perspectives.  
 Interviews were conducted in person in Ottawa, Canada, in October 2015, with current 
and former federal civil servants who were active in the Government of Canada’s scientific 
exchange programs to Russia from the late Soviet period until the 2000s. There were five 
participants interviewed in total. Participants were selected purposefully by the following 
criteria: past work in Chukotka and/or Russia; current work with Russia/Arctic Council; 
availability for an interview; and, snowball sampling, where one participant suggested another 
potential interviewee. Interviews were recorded with a portable audio recording device with the 
written permission and prior and informed consent of the participants. I then transcribed the 
audio recordings in order to produce an electronic word document for subsequent thematic 
coding and data analysis. The interview transcripts were then sent back to the interviewees to 
review for accuracy and allow for redactions or additions to the data. Field notes, including 
interview notes as well as post-interview reflections, were taken to supplement the recorded 
interviews. Consistent documentation while collecting data in the field acted as a safeguard 
against technological failure (Dunn, 2010).  
 The interviews provided a very precise and rich dataset. Two of the five participants 
heavily edited the transcribed interview by request and at their own discretion. While, in some 
cases, it would be counter-productive to allow for such editing, this research required 
participants to remember events from up to two-decades prior and their editing provided a very 
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complete dataset that reliance on direct and quick recall would not have produced. Even though 
the sample size is small, the data collected is significant to this research because it provides a 
firsthand account of cooperation on institution building and political development in the Russian 
Far East. Although their importance cannot be overstated, key informant interviews are just one 
part of the overall dataset. 
 Because conducting interviews in Chukotka was not feasible, there is a gap in the 
knowledge generated by this research. Dr. Lennard Sillanpåå, political scientist and author of 
Awakening Siberia (2005) suggested that I “data mine”12 his interviews with Yupiget from his 
book. While the interviews were conducted for another purpose, they do provide more recent 
perspectives and the interview participants include individuals who were originally targeted for 
this research. Data mining is in no way attempting to replace what key informant interviews 
would have produced, but is a resource available when other opportunities fail to materialize. 
The interviews from Awakening Siberia will help to fill in gaps and confirm other information 
during the analysis of the results. 
Documentary Analysis 
 In addition, I have undertaken a documentary analysis to complement the interviews as a 
source data for this research. According to Waitt (2010), the first and arguably most important 
step in the textual analysis is the selection of materials for analysis. The document analysis 
included books, both paper and electronically available scholarly journals, a range of newspapers 
from the Arctic regions, technical reports from governments and NGOs, legislation from both 
national and sub-national governments, NGO documentation, and other related legal and non-
legal documents. Documents were used in part to assemble a “written record” of the progression 
																																																								
12 Not in the quantitative sense, but in order to consider his data from an historical institutionalist perspective. 
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of Yupiget political development. By utilizing the written record, “researchers may observe 
political phenomena that are geographically, physically and temporally distant from them” 
(Johnson & Joslyn, 1995: 255-256). 
 Narrative research considers multiple sources of information to illustrate a more 
comprehensive depiction of events. White (1999: 36) suggests that the “best historical research 
draws from a range of material, including public reports, interviews, firsthand accounts by 
participants – anything that contributes to understanding of what actually happened.” A variety 
of documents was collected from multiple disciplines and contributed a range of different 
perspectives on this research. Grey literature collected included reports and other publications 
from research institutes such as Chatham House, Freedom House, Kellogg Institute; reports and 
other publications from Canadian government agencies such as the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade, Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, the 
Senate of Canada, and Russian government agencies such as the Ministry of Justice, and the 
former USSR/Russian Federation State Committee for the North; reports and other publications 
from intergovernmental organizations including the Nordic Council of Ministers, Arctic Council, 
United Nations and publications from NGOs such as Inuit Circumpolar Council, Russian 
Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East, International Working 
Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), and Arctic Network for the Support of the Indigenous 
Peoples of the Russian Arctic. Scholarly literature collected includes peer-reviewed journals and 
books from a range of academic disciplines. Newspapers and news media collected include local 
and regional online newspapers such as Nunatsiaq Online, Alaska Dispatch, Barents Observer 
and Arctic-Info; Russian language online newspapers Vestnik Kavkaza and Krainy Sever; and 
Russian English language publications including Russia Today, Ria Novosti/Sputnik, Moscow 
Times, and Siberian Times. The research also considered legislation such as the Russian 
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Federation Constitution (1993) and Constitution of the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug (1997). 
 Most of the documents collected for the document analysis were chosen because they 
offered a perspective on Yupiget, Russian Indigenous peoples, Russian law, and/or Russian 
society. Many of the documents contributing to the narrative were chosen for their broad content 
and not by some rigid inclusion criteria developed at the outset. Having flexible criteria for 
document selection allowed me to adopt a wider perspective and encouraged a steep progression 
in my own understanding of the political development of Yupiget.  
Conclusions  
 This thesis will use historical institutionalism to frame an explanation of the current 
status of Yupiget political autonomy. By highlighting critical junctures and the resulting path 
dependencies, I aim to provide a broad analysis of Yupiget political, economic and cultural 
development from the Soviet period through to the present day. A documentary analysis is 
presented over the next several chapters to trace the process of institutional development of 
Yupiget and highlight key events through the Soviet, Soviet transition, and contemporary 
Russian Federation periods. In each period, I will examine domestic political developments and 
international cooperation as common and interconnected themes in Yupiget institutional 
development in order to show how the institutional context changed over time and how this has 
affected Yupiget ability to self-determine. Evidence from the in-person interviews and data 
mined interviews will be referenced throughout to give perspective and add context to the 
documentary analysis.  
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Chapter 3: The Subjugation of Yupiget Political Institutions 1923-1985 
 The establishment of Soviet rule in Chukotka initiated a series of institutional changes to 
the political, economic and social development of Yupiget. Large-scale resettlements, sweeping 
economic reforms, and policies aimed towards social engineering removed Yupiget control over 
every aspect of their lives and secured their total dependence on the state. However, the Soviet 
Union was also involved from the beginning in the creation of the international cooperation 
regime in the Arctic. As Soviet officials sought out help in resolving some of the challenges of 
the USSR’s Indigenous peoples, some of those controls were relinquished. The introduction of 
Yupiget to their Inuit kin from around the circumpolar north resulted in a flood of information 
and cultural revival practices that changed Yupiget dependency on the state. Sweeping 
institutional changes allowed Inuit organizations from outside the Soviet Union to contribute to 
building new institutions aimed at realizing Yupiget political autonomy and self-determination. 
The result was the appearance of two opposing paths to the political development of Yupiget: 
one historically repressive to Yupiget institutional development, and the other initiating a rather 
supportive path. 
Political Developments in the Soviet Union 
 Before the arrival of the Bolsheviks, Yupiget were generally unaffected by the increasing 
reach of the Russian Empire as it swept across Siberia and into the Russian Far East (Sablin, 
2012). They were not forced to pay yasak – a tribute of furs to the Tsar, nor were they converted 
to Christianity like many other Indigenous peoples of the Russian north (Newell, 2004). Due to 
its extremely isolated geography, the last reaches of the Eurasian continent largely escaped 
subordination to external rule until the arrival of the Soviets (Forsythe, 1992).  
 Soviet authority was established Chukotka in 1923 (Abryutina, 2007). Sablin (2012: 221) 
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argues that the relationship between Soviet authorities and Indigenous peoples in Chukotka over 
the first few decades of the 20th century became “asymmetric, involuntary and non-alternative, 
and that it was this change that embodied the subjugation of the region.” The “Committee of the 
North13” (Goskomsever) was established in 1924 to help integrate the USSR’s Indigenous 
peoples into Soviet society and grant “equal rights” for all citizens (Nielsen, 2007). 
Goskomsever’s formation effectively disbanded the Russian Empire’s Indigenous councils and 
abolished the Empire’s official position entitled ‘Regulations on Indigenous Peoples’ (Vakhtin, 
1998). Goskomsever was the main branch of the Soviet government tasked with advancing the 
cultural and economic development of the peoples of the North and creating legislation to protect 
their “unique” way of life while promoting equality among all citizens of the USSR (Pika, 1999). 
 Lenin’s policy of korenizatsiya (indigenization) sought to elevate Indigenous peoples to 
power positions within local administrations and branches of the Communist Party (Gray, 2005). 
Korenizatsiya was supposed to increase class-consciousness, eventually leading to the decline of 
ethnic identity, by emphasizing the equal rights to participation by each “nationality.” While 
attempts were made from the outset to promote forms of legal protection of Indigenous peoples’ 
land and culture14, rights to land and resources were eventually nationalized, thus preferential 
access was denied to all nationalities (Fondahl and Poelzer, 2003).   
 The legacy of the early integration of Yupiget into the Soviet Union can be characterized 
by a series of village relocations. The first relocation occurred in 1926 when ten families were 
moved hundreds of kilometers from the village of Provideniya to Wrangell Island in the Chukchi 
																																																								
13 The Committee for the Assistance of the Peoples of the Northern Outlying Districts became State Committee on 
the Social and Economic Development of the Northern Regions in the 1990s, which is known by the acronym 
Goskomsever. Goskomsever will be used in this thesis to describe the single Russian State department responsible for 
Indigenous affairs until 2001. 
14 See Vakhtin (1998) for a description of Soviet legal acts pertaining to Indigenous peoples. 
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Sea. Goskomsever’s first kultbaza15 was established on St Lawrence Bay in the Chukchi 
Peninsula in 1928 led to the creation of a joint sea-hunting enterprise between Chukchi and 
Yupiget hunters with the purchase of ten motorboats on credit from the state (Forsythe, 1992). In 
the 1930s, five more families were encouraged to relocate to Ratmanov (Big Diomede) Island in 
the middle of the Bering Strait. The relocations were in part an effort to inhabit remote stretches 
of the Arctic in order to support the USSR’s territorial claims. Additionally, collective farms 
were established in Ungaziq (Old Chaplino) to manage Indigenous resources and protect 
traditional customs (Callaway and Pilyasov, 1993). State paternalism towards Russia’s 
Indigenous minorities increased as Russian surnames were assigned to Yupiget, and a writing 
system established, first in Roman characters, then in 1937, in Cyrillic (Stern, 2013).   
 In the 1940s, the Soviet policy of ukreplenie (consolidation) became “increasingly 
aggressive” as Yupiget residents of smaller villages were forced to relocate to larger settlements 
to support the establishment of kovkhozy (collective farms) in Chukotka (Gray, 2001) and make 
way for the Soviet military industrial complex of the Russian Far East (Krupnik and Chlenov, 
2007). The relationship between Yupiget and non-Indigenous settlers developed from the 
beginning as two cultures in contrast. Speaking to the influence of newcomers on Yupiget 
culture, a former Yupik radio host recalled: 
Russians began to appear here en masse in the 1940s. People were friendlier at that time. 
Bad attitudes started to emerge later; many of them do not regard Indigenous residents as 
humans. There is a widespread opinion among many newcomers that the Indigenous 
population do [sic] not need any rights. Many authorities figure that too much is being 
done for Indigenous people (quoted in Sillanpåå, 2005: 564). 																																																								
15 ‘Culture Base’ – a social and cultural institution tasked with advancing the principles of the Communist Party to 
nearby Indigenous settlements and rural areas. For more information, see Forsythe, 1992: 245. 	
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In 1948, over 200 residents of Ratmanov Island were transferred to the village of Naukan 
(Robert-Lamblin, 1993). As the 1940s came to an end, the remaining villages of Chukotka were 
modernized, or had established Soviet administrative centers and local branches of the 
Communist Party. Soviet rule restricted Yupiget traditional networks and interaction with their 
neighbours. Compounded by growing Cold War tensions, Yupiget found themselves 
increasingly isolated from their relatives in nearby Alaska, and contact with them was eventually 
severed (Stern, 2013). The social engineering of the early Soviet era was replaced by a drastic 
increase in resource development and an expansion of the Soviet industrial military complex 
(Schindler, 1994). 
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Fig. 2 Chukchi Peninsula – Shows relocated villages in Russian language. Adapted from Karta Chukotskogo 
Avtonomnogo Okruga. Available at http://rus-map.ru/230467.html 
 
 The 1950s ushered in a new era of large-scale industrial development (Sillanpåå, 2005). 
Chukotka was administered as an “autonomous okrug” of the larger Magadan Oblast 
(Thompson, 2008). In order to support the rapid industrial development of the North, 
resettlements continued through the 1950s. The village of Naukan was forcibly closed and the 
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population dispersed between Nunyamo, Pinakul and Lavrentiya. Nunyamo and Pinakul later 
also closed, and the population was dispersed even further (Robert-Lamblin, 1993). Additionally, 
Ungazik (Chaplino) was closed and its population was relocated to New Chaplino, which was 
closer to the administrative center in Provideniya, but further from productive Yupiget hunting 
grounds (Ibid). The 1950s can be characterized by what Kertulla (2002) calls the “great 
transformation:” the extraction of natural resource wealth and the Soviet “enlightenment” of 
Indigenous peoples. The result was the creation of large, permanent settler populations in new 
mixed Chukchi, Yupik and Russian communities (Thompson, 2002).  
 By the end of the 1950s the highly centralized state-school system was fully implemented 
with rigid, centralized control and very little allowance for teaching Indigenous languages 
(Krupnik and Chlenov, 2002). The early Soviet policy of korenizatsiya imposed on Chukotka’s 
Indigenous peoples to conquer ‘backwardness’ instead resulted in the institutionalization of 
ethnic identity in local political organization (Kertulla, 2000). It also resulted in the development 
of an Indigenous intelligentsia16 comprised of well-educated individuals who were promoted to 
coveted positions within the Communist Party (Haruchi, 2002).  
 As the economic modernization project of the Soviet authorities forged ahead, the 1960s 
ushered in the era known as the “mastery of the North” (severnoe osvoenie) (Thomson, 2008).  
This era was characterized by the rapid surge of timber and mineral extraction and a large influx 
of non-Indigenous settlers to meet increased labour force demands (Ibid). The authorities in 
Moscow had absolute power in terms of deciding on the location and the size of industrial 
development projects in the Far East, and large waves of Soviet citizens migrated to fill the need 
																																																								
16 The use of the term ‘Indigenous intelligentsia’ is used by scholars such as Gray (2005), Haryuchi (2002), Rethman 
(2001) and others to describe the Indigenous individuals who received advanced education and were indoctrinated in 
Communist and Marxist ideology in the USSR before taking up leadership roles in their respective fields. 	
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for labour (King, 1998). Non-Indigenous Russians were attracted to Chukotka by the higher 
wages, longer vacations and earlier pensions offered to professionals who chose to apply their 
trade in Chukotka (Thompson, 2008). The combined effects of extensive relocations and rapid 
industrial development on Russia’s Indigenous peoples included the loss of culture, language and 
traditional knowledge, and the relentless environmental degradation of their traditional lands.  
 During the early Soviet period, a series of particular policies influenced the political and 
economic development of Yupiget and other Indigenous and ethnic minorities in the Soviet 
Union. The policy of korenizatsiya accomplished two main goals. First, it created separate 
republics and autonomous areas for some national minorities17 (including Indigenous minorities) 
within the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) granting a de jure foundation 
for political autonomy and self-determination for some of the larger minorities, although it was 
really never exercised in practice (Kertulla, 2000). Second, it was used by the Communist Party 
to encourage the “upward mobility of non-Russian, ethnically marginalized people” (Rethman, 
2001: 414). Soviet authorities believed korenizatsiya to be the policy lever that would elevate 
Indigenous peoples from their “backwards” and “primitive” socio-economic state into the Soviet 
proletariat and eventually into leadership positions within the Communist Party. In practice, 
however, it created social divisions between those who received a formal post-secondary 
education and became managers in kolkhozy or held leadership positions in local administrative 
bodies or the within Communist party, and those who were labourers (Gray, 2005). One of my 
interviewees described an early Soviet policy towards the overall development of Indigenous 
culture:  
In that region, there was kind of a division of labour. Some people got government, some 
																																																								
17 National minorities include Indigenous peoples and peoples not considered Indigenous by the Russian definition 
such as Tatars, Karelians, Yakuts etc. For further explanation, see Prina, 2016. 
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got the Communist Party, others would get legislative powers…so there was this idea of - 
the old divide and conquer - so that no ethnic group would control all the levers of power 
(Interview, October 2015). 
By using the “divide and conquer” tactic, Soviet authorities showed evidence of taking 
Indigenous issues seriously, while edging towards assimilation by indoctrinating the Indigenous 
intelligentsia in socialist principles. One of the outcomes of the policy of korenizatsiya, 
therefore, was the institutionalization of ethnic identity, rather than the assimilation of 
Indigenous minorities. 
 The policy of ukreplenie completely restructured Indigenous peoples’ political, economic 
and social forms of organization. Ukreplenie socialized Indigenous economic activity, which 
erased the previous subsistence system and transformed kin-based economic organization into 
state-owned collective farms, quite often sustained by government subsidies in the Russian north 
(Diatchkova, 2001). However, it took a long time for policies in Moscow to develop across the 
Russian Far East.  For example, it was not until 1972 that Soviet authorities restricted Yupiget 
whaling to a collectivized commercial activity, thereby expanding the breadth of state 
paternalism to every aspect of Yupiget social, economic, and political life (Stern, 2013). 
 Furthermore, between the 1920s and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the USSR 
established hundreds of legal acts that directly or indirectly affected Indigenous peoples; 
however, their ineffectiveness was, in part, due to the belief that state policy alone is sufficient to 
resolve challenges faced by Russia’s Indigenous minorities (Pika, 1999). As the USSR neared its 
demise, new legal solutions for the challenges faced by Indigenous peoples were codified. There 
were guaranteed rights for land use and traditional economic activity, language rights and 
cultural protection, and new laws were introduced on local self-government (Kryazhkov, 2013). 
There was, however, no single legislative Act (such as Canada’s Indian Act of 1876) to aggregate 
	 44 
Soviet state policy towards Indigenous peoples (Poelzer, 1996). The legacies of korenizatisiya 
and ukreplenie epitomized the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Soviet state 
throughout the Soviet period.  
International Cooperation and the Soviet Union 
 The establishment of the current international legal regime occurred with the full 
participation of the Soviet Union (Hazard, 1950). As a founding member of the United Nations, 
the USSR participated in early discussions around the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR). Prina (2016: 59-60) offers two main arguments with regard to the Soviet Union 
and the establishment of an international legal regime: the first is that there are no “distinct and 
mutually exclusive trajectories” between “the West” and the USSR’s international development; 
and, the second is that domestic factors, including “historical and institutional legacies” and the 
“prevailing attitudes to such norms” affect the application of international norms domestically. 
As the inheritor of international treaties signed by the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation has 
continued to view and apply international legal norms in the same manner as its predecessor. 
 In the late 1960s, Indigenous peoples across the circumpolar north, particularly Inuit, 
began to articulate their domestic grievances to an international audience. In January 1969, the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) was 
adopted by the United Nations. It was the first convention of its kind, and was particularly 
important for Inuit. The Convention states that participants should “recognize the right of 
Indigenous peoples to own, develop, control and use their lands, territories and resources and, 
where these lands and territories traditionally controlled or inhabited by them were taken from 
them or are being exploited without their free and informed consent, measures should be taken 
for the restitution of these lands and territories” (Pavlov, 2005: 41). Within a year, Denmark, 
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Canada, the United States and the USSR all agreed to participate in a permanent secretariat 
concerned with Inuit issues (Stern, 2013). It was however, just the beginning of the era of 
international Indigenous political organization.  
 In November 1973, the first Arctic Peoples’ Conference was held in Copenhagen, 
Denmark. The conference gathered Indigenous peoples from the around the circumpolar north to 
discuss the shared political, economic and social challenges faced by Indigenous peoples and 
Inuit. The conference provided the vision for what would become the Inuit Circumpolar 
Conference18 (Shadian, 2007). The first Inuit Circumpolar Conference was held in June 1977, in 
Barrow, Alaska and was hosted by Mayor Eben Hopson. Regarding the purpose of the event, 
Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK), the national Inuit organization in Canada, released the following 
statement:  
The single most important issue facing all Inuit, regardless of where they live, is the 
preservation of a unique culture, identity and way of life before they are destroyed by 
large-scale industrial development and the intrusions of southern society. Growing political 
awareness among Inuit has made them realize they must speak out with a strong united 
voice to protect their national and trans-national interests. To that end, delegates in Barrow 
will discuss the forming of an ongoing internationally representative organization to 
promote and develop programs that may be setup by this conference (ITK, 2015 [1977]).  
Yupiget were the only Inuit not present, likely because institutional constraints in the Soviet 
Union prevented their participation. Still, the ICC provided an institutional home for all Inuit, 
and gained formal recognition by the UN in 1983 when it was granted NGO status in the UN 
Economic and Social Council (Abele and Rodon, 2007; Wilson, 2007).  
 At the third Inuit Circumpolar Conference in Iqaluit, Canada in 1983, three important 																																																								
18 Inuit Circumpolar Council was formerly known as the Inuit Circumpolar Conference. 
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developments occurred that pertained to Yupiget of the Soviet Union. The first was a resolution 
to restrict the use of Arctic spaces to non-military purposes, which was passed by delegates, who 
also advocated unsuccessfully for a nuclear-free Arctic. The second was the cancelling of a 
Russian Inuit cultural performance by Soviet Ambassador Yuri Yepelev, who misunderstood the 
funding arrangements as an American initiative, when in fact Canada as its host, financed the 
entire conference. And the third was the largely symbolic creation of two seats for Yupiget for 
whenever Soviet authorities would permit their participation (Inuit Circumpolar Conference, 
1984). Delegates from the conference also termed the Soviet Union’s refusal to provide 
information on Alaskan (Central) Yupiit relatives as a “human rights violation” (Ibid).  
 The ICC’s beginnings were largely connected to preserving Inuit culture. Key elements 
of Inuit culture such as language and storytelling are embedded in Arctic landscapes and the 
environment. In 1985, the ICC established its own Environmental Commission to develop a 
unique Inuit Arctic conservation strategy. The result was the establishment of the world’s first 
‘Indigenous’ and ‘regional’ conservation approach that outlined the path towards sustainable 
resource development with full recognition of local subsistence and cultural needs (Nuttall, 
1998). However, Soviet authorities did not recognize Inuit and Indigenous rights in the same 
way as other countries with a resident Inuit population. Although Inuit land claims and self-
government agreements were in the process of being negotiated and finalized across the 
circumpolar north, Yupiget were not even permitted to participate in the activities of the ICC. 
 Canada’s bilateral relationship with the Russian Federation began in the late Soviet 
period, and accelerated with the formation of the Canada-USSR Arctic Scientific Exchange 
Program in 1984, which was the culmination of almost two decades worth of relationship 
building between the two countries. One participant described it as a “unique partnership” in 
which then Soviet Committee of the North (Goskomsever) worked with Canadian Department of 
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Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND) in tandem with relevant NGOs –the 
Association of Indigenous Minorities in Russia (RAIPON) and ICC Canada - to develop a 
training program with exchanges and workshops. 
 One interviewee noted that Canada’s early engagement with Russian Yupiget occurred 
simultaneously with the establishment of the ICC. In the early 1980s, the former Canadian 
Minster of DIAND, David Crombie, encouraged international engagement among Indigenous 
peoples, and particularly among Inuit. Uncertainties about working with NGOs on behalf of the 
Russian government were partially quelled by the involvement of DIAND, a Canadian 
government department. 
Conclusions 
 The establishment of the Soviet Union brought sweeping institutional change across the 
Russian Far East. Starting with the formation of Goskomsever, a series of policies were 
introduced to modernize Russian Indigenous peoples in order to become model Soviet citizens. 
These policies were extremely colonial, and transferred political, economic and social control 
from Indigenous peoples to the local branch of Communist Party, whose directives came from 
Central Party authorities in Moscow. Early on in the Soviet period, such policies were aimed 
towards progressive protections for Indigenous minorities as well as the ease of administration of 
local Soviets. However, conquering localized challenges concerning the development of 
Indigenous peoples eventually yielded to focus on the statewide challenges of economic growth 
and the Soviet government’s commitments to central planning. Furthermore, the early social 
engineering of the Communist Party gave way to efforts to transform and modernize the Soviet 
economy. The centralizing forces of the Soviet Union ensured the complete subordination of 
Yupiget and other Indigenous peoples. In this institutional context, any attempt to return to 
previous political, economic and social systems was unlikely.  
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 While the Soviet authorities were advancing state dependency of Indigenous peoples, 
they were also working collaboratively to establish the institutions of the international 
cooperation regime in the Arctic. In fact, during the late-Soviet period, the USSR was an 
instrumental partner in facilitating Inuit internationalism. Goskomsever worked closely with 
DIAND to solve some of the key challenges faced by Inuit across the circumpolar north. 
However, the Soviet Union’s desire to be included in the international institution-building 
regime ran counter to its domestic isolationist policies. Internationally, the Soviet Union wanted 
to be seen as an involved partner, while at home, authorities limited Yupiget opportunities to 
engage with their circumpolar counterparts, presumably in an effort to limit their ability to 
advocate for self-determination and political autonomy.  
 The next chapter will follow institutional changes in the late-Soviet period through the 
post-Soviet transition where the domestic political institutions in the Soviet Union experienced 
rapid change culminating with the dissolution of the USSR. A flood of international 
organizations rushed into the nascent Russian Federation providing humanitarian aid and 
political advocacy with very little political interference. A volatile mix of such institutions 
appearing in Chukotka created a small window of opportunity for Yupiget to revive and re-
establish lost political, economic and social practices.   
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Chapter 4: Opportunity to Re-establish Yupiget Political Autonomy 1985-2000 
 Rapid institutional changes swept across the USSR beginning in the mid-1980s, and 
continued through the development of the Russian Federation. New opportunities for the 
political, economic and social advancement of Russia’s Indigenous peoples resulted partially 
from the devolution of authority from the center to the regions. Simultaneously, Yupiget 
received support for their internationally shared objective of protecting their Arctic homelands 
from the negative effects of resource development and the cultural loss such development 
caused. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the Arctic cooperation 
regime altered the forces of institutional repression characteristic of the Soviet period and began 
a series of institutional changes that were far more supportive of Indigenous self-determination. 
Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost and perestroika triggered a cascade of effects including the 
decentralization of authority, new legal protections, increased international engagement and the 
development of a burgeoning civil society which combined to provide new opportunities for 
Yupiget to seek political autonomy throughout the late Soviet and early post-Soviet periods.  
Political Developments in the Transitional USSR/Russian Federation 
 New opportunities for Yupiget political and legal development began in the late-Soviet 
period through the relaxing of centralized control in the era of glasnost and perestroika and 
rapidly expanded through the post-Soviet transition period. Pika and Prokhorov (1989) published 
a paper in 1988 in the Communist Party’s official journal titled “The Big Problems of the Small 
Ethnic Groups.” It highlighted the extent of the socio-economic disparity of the USSR’s northern 
Indigenous peoples, in stark opposition to the popular notion that Indigenous peoples had made 
significant progress towards becoming model Soviet socialist citizens (Fondahl and Poelzer, 
1997). Indeed, due in part to glasnost and perestroika new opportunities arose to discuss such 
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things openly and create institutions to support the cultural revival and political autonomy of 
Indigenous peoples across an increasingly weakened Soviet Union. New legal protections were 
introduced to begin to resolve the challenges identified in “The Big Problems of the Small Ethnic 
Peoples.” In April 1990, the USSR enacted legislation titled, On the unhindered development of 
citizens of the USSR who live outside their ethnic areas, or have no such areas, within the 
territory of the USSR which allowed for political associations based on nationality or ethnic 
identity and provided a framework for the creation of a regional Inuit organization (Slezkine, 
1994). In fact, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, unprecedented opportunities 
arose for the rapid institutional development of Indigenous peoples in the new Russian 
Federation.  
 The 1992 Russian Federation Treaty was a series of different treaties that gave different 
powers to different types of constituent entities such as national republics, autonomous districts 
(Okrug) and cities of federal significance. Theoretically, the treaty formalized equality between 
each of Russia’s federal constituent units, enhanced the role of regional governments and 
established the role of regional governor (Krupnik & Vakhtin, 2002). In practice, the treaty, a 
stark example of a culture of asymmetrical federalism, defined the division of powers between 
the federal and regional governments, including provinces, territories, regions and autonomous 
areas of Russia.  
 As the forces of decentralization swept across Russia, proponents of Indigenous self-
government began to explore new possibilities. Two important challenges are noted by Poelzer 
(1996: 145) with regard to the “devolution” of power and authority in the Russian Federation as 
it pertains to the prospect of Indigenous self-government were: a crisis of “economic self-
sufficiency” – Indigenous economic activity had previously been heavily subsidized by the state 
and became uncompetitive after the end of the Soviet period; and, “a crisis of authority” – 
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authority was devolved to regional governments “without the corresponding institutionalization 
of political power.” The result was that local governments acquired all of the responsibility to 
provide local services and programs, but lacked the authority and resources to enforce or support 
local programming. Regional legislation was often in conflict with federal legislation or 
presidential edicts. It was unclear which level of government, in practice, maintained ultimate 
authority (Wilson, 2000). Contributing to the “crisis of authority,” a presidential decree was 
announced to protect Indigenous peoples’ use of their traditional lands and territories, with no 
legislation to enforce it. 
 In April 1992, Presidential Edict 397 declared the intention to delineate “Territories of 
Traditional Nature Use” (TTNUs) as the “inalienable property” of Indigenous peoples, free from 
industrial development and specially designated for the use of traditional economic activities 
(Fondahl & Poelzer, 2003). Additionally, the declaration intended to “provide for the lifetime 
ownership with hereditary succession or lease of pastures for hunting, fishing and other grounds 
by Indigenous communes and families, without charge” (Kryazhkov, 2013). Furthermore, the 
Edict compelled Russian regional governments to cooperate with Indigenous organizations to 
ensure implementation (Kirillin, 2002). The post-Soviet federal legal framework relative to 
Russia’s Indigenous peoples was indeed very progressive and showed great promise in helping 
to alleviate the socio-economic challenges faced by Indigenous peoples of the Russian Far East. 
 In December 1993, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed into law the Constitution of 
the Russian Federation. Due to the growing awareness of the socio-economic challenges facing 
Russia’s Indigenous minorities, as well as its international obligations, the federal government 
added legal protections for Indigenous peoples into the Constitution of the Russian Federation. 
Article 69 “guarantees the rights of the numerically-small Indigenous peoples in accordance with 
the universal principles and norms of international law and the international treaties of the 
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Russian Federation” (Pavlov, 2005: 38). Accordingly, the following year Chukotka initiated the 
“10 year program of Chukotka Indigenous peoples to 2004” to improve housing, health services, 
culture and education (Diatchkova, 2001). Both the federal and regional governments recognized 
the challenges facing Indigenous peoples, though no coordinated effort was made to help 
alleviate the effects of their isolation and lack of capacity to act politically, economically or 
socially. By the end of April 1999, a new federal law entitled On Guarantees of the Rights of 
Small-Numbered Indigenous Peoples [FL-No. 82] was enacted to	“consolidat[e] the legal basis of 
the status of Indigenous peoples” in the Russian Federation (Kryazhkov, 2013: 144). However, 
there were problems implementing the law across Russia’s regions. 
 Upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union, democratic, capitalist institutions swiftly 
replaced Soviet, communist institutions. A lack of capacity, a range of competing interests and 
corruption within the regional administration challenged the successful implementation of 
federal legislation in Chukotka. The speed at which the transition occurred significantly affected 
the Kremlin’s ability to govern and operate programs and services outside of Moscow, especially 
in remote, northern regions like Chukotka. The immediate effect on Chukotka was a massive 
outmigration of the settler population. Many working age residents left Chukotka, and typically 
only pensioners and Indigenous peoples remained (Thompson, 2008). Rapid socio-economic 
changes occurred throughout the newly established Russian Federation.   
Political Developments in Chukotka 
Between 1991 and 1993, structural changes to the regional governance regime by 
President Boris Yeltsin saw the former head of the national and regional Soviet, a Chukchi 
named Vladimir Etylin, Chair of the Chukotka Duma, who presided over Chukotka’s secession 
from Magadan in 1990, replaced by an ethnic Russian named Aleksandr Nazarov, who became 
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Chair of the Executive Committee in Chukotka. The two operated in a power sharing capacity 
(dvoevlastie) until the “violent dissolution” of the Supreme Soviet, resulting in Nazarov’s 
election as Governor of Chukotka (Thompson, 2008). A presidential edict removed the 
dvoevlastie style leadership and encouraged democratic elections to legitimize the authority of a 
single Governor. However, in the first such instance, questionable circumstances surrounded 
whether Aleksandr Nazarov had legitimately gained the endorsement of the Presidium of the 
local Association of Small-Numbered Indigenous Peoples in Anadyr to become the first elected 
Governor of Chukotka in 1996 (Gray, 2005). 
 With Nazarov’s governorship, the level of Indigenous representation in Okrug level 
governance declined and Indigenous activism was suppressed (Ibid). In a way, he went against 
the tide of openness that existed at the national level. In some respects, this was indicative of the 
divisions between the federal and regional governments that existed during the 1990s and the 
inability of the federal government to control far away regions and their governments. Regions 
became individual fiefdoms of their governors (Wilson, 2000). Nazarov’s governorship was 
characterized by his tactical use of “harassment,” “intimidation” and rule by “authoritarian 
decree” (Rethman, 2004). By the mid-1990s, this was evident in two events that significantly 
affected Yupiget. Krainii Sever (the Far North), the official newspaper in Chukotka included a 
supplemental independent Indigenous newspaper with the Chukchi name Murgin Nutenut (Our 
Homeland). The Indigenous publication was staffed by ten Indigenous journalists and included 
sections in Yupik and Even languages (Diatchkova, 2010). Nazarov began a series of actions 
including moving the physical space in which the editorial staff worked, decreasing its budget, 
and charging for the use of Krainii Sever’s computers and printing press. These actions 
culminated with the decision to cease operations altogether in October 1995 (Gray, 2004). With 
all the Indigenous journalists fired, Murgin Nutenut became a one-page pull out in Krainii Sever 
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and failed to represent the voices of the Indigenous peoples it once served (Diatchkova, 2010). 
 The other event was directly related to the involvement of Yupiget with their Alaskan 
counterparts. During 1997 and 1998, Vladimir Etylin described the taste of harvested sea 
mammals and fish as "peculiar" (Ainana, Zelensky and Bychkov, 2001: 188). Members of YESC 
along with their Alaskan counterparts sent a letter to Nazarov to request permission to proceed 
with a scientific inquiry to investigate the reason for the tainted meat. Nazarov responded five 
months later that testing was too expensive, and any proposed projects must be cleared with the 
Russian Academy of Sciences because “scientific investigations must meet certain standards” 
(Ibid). 
 Nazarov’s ineffective leadership, presumed greed and unaccountability culminated in 
crisis. According to the Federal Living Cost and Prices Prognosis Centre, Anadyr was the most 
expensive city in which to live in Russia (Krupnik and Vakhtin, 2002). The socio-economic 
situation in the region became so dire that the monthly subsistence wage19 in Anadyr increased 
from 388 000 to 580 000 rubles from April to June in 1995 (Ibid). In December 1996, it was 
reported that food prices increased 122% in the first five months of 1996, and the region’s 
schools, like many of those in Russia’s regions, lacked basic materials such as paper and books 
(George, 1996). During the run up to the regional election in 2000, Nazarov ceded his 
governorship to Kremlin-endorsed candidate Roman Abramovich, and opted instead for a seat at 
the Council of the Federation, the upper chamber of the Russian parliament in Moscow, in part 
because he faced multiple charges of corruption and tax fraud, but also because it was very 
unlikely that he would win re-election (Gray, 2005). The grim situation faced by residents of 
Chukotka was broadcast to their circumpolar neighbours, and Inuit from Canada and Alaska 
organized donations of food, equipment and money to help their Russian kin through a severe 																																																								
19 The cost of 19 staple foods in Anadyr. 
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humanitarian crisis. 
Civil Society and Indigenous Activism in the Russian Far East 
 Krupnik and Vakhtin (2002: 7) characterize the late 1980s and early 1990s as a period of 
“post-Socialist transition.” Gray (2005: 180-181) notes that the basic communication and 
transportation infrastructure was in a state of dissolution and describes the political climate in 
Chukotka as caught between “open interaction and exchange” and “xenophobia and hostility 
towards outsiders.” Indigenous rights were restricted to local administration and matters of self-
government (Gray, 2001). Yupiget intelligentsia, who were previously social activists within the 
Soviet Union, naturally became social activists within the context of the Russian Federation 
(Gray, 2007). From the onset of the 1990s, the emergence of the Indigenous rights movement 
was supported at the Okrug level; however, a wave of opposition to regionalism swept across 
Russia within the decade (Pelaudeix, 2012). The advent of Indigenous activism in the form of 
Indigenous NGOs in Chukotka can be traced back to Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost. A direct 
outcome of the rapid change in norms during the final stages of Soviet authority, glasnost 
resulted in the formation of a variety of NGOs in Chukotka and across the Soviet Union. 
 The first local Indigenous NGO in Chukotka was the Naukan Native Cooperative (NNC). 
It was established in Lavrentiya in 1987, and comprised of both Chukchi and Yupik hunters. Its 
purpose was to supply residents with traditional foods such as walrus, seal and other marine 
mammals and was expected to revive traditional subsistence practices lost over the decades of 
Soviet rule (Hurst, 2011). The NNC also partnered with Alaskan organizations to initiate a 
wildlife management strategy of shared resources in the Bering Sea. 
 In January 1990, the Association of Indigenous Peoples of Chukotka and Kolyma was 
established in Anadyr to represent Indigenous peoples’ interests in Chukotka. A larger, national 
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organization was established in March 1990 at the first Congress of the Association of 
Numerically Small Peoples of the North in Moscow. The Russian Association of Indigenous 
Peoples of the North (RAIPON) is a pan-Russian Indigenous organization and a Permanent 
Participant in the Arctic Council. Its purpose is the cultural preservation of the Russian 
Federation’s 41 Indigenous groups and 35 regional associations. According to the first President, 
V.M. Sangi, RAIPON was established because “in order for northern peoples to realize their full 
rights, they must have “real” autonomy guaranteed by law” (Schindler, 1992: 62). Sangi called 
for the immediate ratification of International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 169 by the 
Soviet government, and the strict monitoring of adherence to its principles (Vakhtin, 1998).  
 In August 1990, the “Yupik” Eskimo Society of Chukotka (YESC) was established, with 
some controversy, within the Association of Indigenous Peoples of Chukotka and Kolyma to 
unite all Russian Inuit and preserve their language, culture and way of life (Ainana, 2001). The 
controversy arose due to the exclusivity of such a small Indigenous organization operating in 
Chukotka without including the other Indigenous groups. According to activist, and later ICC 
Russia Executive Director Tatiana Achirgina-Arsiak (1992), Yupiget sought protection in the 
form of a non-profit NGO because they are one of the smallest Indigenous minorities in the 
Russian Federation, and they are and always have been against the assimilationist policies of the 
(former) USSR.  
 The second Congress of RAIPON was held in Moscow in 1993, and Eremei Aipen, a 
Khant, replaced Vladimir Sangi as President (Schindler, 1996). In the same year, RAIPON 
officially registered with the Russian government as a public political movement. The Congress 
formally adopted the acronym “RAIPON” (in English) and included the phrase ‘numerically-
small peoples’ in the Russian translation –Association of the Indigenous Numerically-small 
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Numbered Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation.20  
 As the mid-1990s approached, the peak of Indigenous activism in Russia had passed, 
except in Chukotka, where YESC in Lavrentiya and the NNC in Provideniya continued to work 
with organizations in Canada and Alaska to resolve some of the challenges facing Yupiget and 
other Indigenous peoples in Chukotka (Krupnik and Vakhtin, 2002). The deterioration of the 
regional economy and environment encouraged the establishment of the Chukotka Sea Hunter 
Union, comprised of Yupik and Chukchi sea mammal hunters (Sillanpää, 2005).  
 In April of 1999, a discussion occurred at the YESC office in Anadyr regarding 
participation in an Indigenous NGO called Revival of Chukotka (Vozrozhdeniye Chukotki) 
(Ibid). The idea was supported, in part, from the momentum of the Indigenous rights movement, 
and its purpose was to promote active participation in local, regional and federal elections by 
fielding candidates and campaigning for their election to office. While the registered 
organization Revival of Chukotka21 is now defunct, records show it officially operated from 
November 17, 1998 to December 23, 2002 (sbis.ru, 2017) 
 In September 1999, the Arbitration Court of the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug sent a 
notice to YESC detailing a court ordered liquidation of its assets for failing to respond to 
notification to re-register the NGO with Russian authorities (Ainana, Zelensky & Bychkov, 
2001). Being a member of the ICC, YESC was encouraged to attend the next ICC Executive 
Council meeting. YESC did not have the funding to travel, so the Alaska North Slope Borough 
provided financial assistance for their trip to the ICC Executive Council in Washington, D.C in 
November 1999. YESC delegates garnered support from a range of individuals and 
																																																								
20 According to RAIPON’s website, http://raipon.info/ the official Russian title is: Associatsia Korrenikh 
Malochislenikh Narodov Severa, Sibiri, and Dalnego Vostoka Rossiskoi Federatsii. 
21 Возрождение Чукотки. 
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organizations, including Saami22 representatives who shared similar challenges such as members 
across multiple nation-states. The delegates also encouraged the Sakha Republic’s president, 
Mikhail Nikolaev, to discuss YESC’s operations with then governor of Chukotka, Aleksandr 
Nazarov (Ibid). During the ICC Executive Council, ICC passed a resolution stating: Chukotkan 
authorities "repeatedly and systematically harass institutions established by Yupik Eskimos," and 
that "the Governor of Chukotka refuses to allow foreign and domestic scientists, foreign 
Indigenous peoples and others to visit Chukotka without his special permission" and that he is 
"manipulating and undermining the democratic process for the forthcoming local and national 
elections" (George, 1999). Later that month, YESC officials began efforts to re-establish the 
organization as a constituent member of RAIPON. 
International Cooperation in the Transitional USSR/Russian Federation  
 In June 1986, in response to increasing Arctic cooperation between Canada and the 
USSR, Canada’s Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs David Crombie successfully persuaded 
the Soviet authorities to include Russian Inuit in ICC activities starting in 1988 (Slipchenko & 
Hannigan, 2010). By July, Yupiget drummers and dancers travelled to Greenland in the first pan-
Inuit cultural exchange allowed by Soviet authorities (Stern, 2013). Finally, all circumpolar Inuit 
were able to meet, collaborate and share ideas in an international forum. In June 1988, Alaskan 
Yupiit travelled from Nome to Provideniya to meet with their kin and renew relationships broken 
since the onset of the Cold War (Hurst, 2011; Stern, 2013). In September, a Yupiget delegation 
visited Nome. In 1989, the USSR and the US negotiated a visa-free travel regime for Yupiget 
and Yupiit. They eventually permitted American and Russian scientists to collaborate on a whale 
observation program (Hurst, 2011; Schweitzer and Gray, 2000). As the 1980s came to an end, 																																																								
22 Saami are another Indigenous group whose territory spans across multiple nation-states – Russia, Finland, Sweden 
and Norway.  
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Inuit transnational activism gained momentum, and at the same time, Indigenous rights were 
increasingly recognized around the world. 
 In 1989, the UN’s International Labour Organization Convention 169: Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries 
(ILO Convention 169) was adopted. The Convention demands included the right to self-
governance and preferential access to land. Soviet authorities perceived these demands as a 
direct contradiction of domestic policy that offered state-funded medical access, free education 
and transportation to the USSR’s Indigenous peoples (Murashko, 2002). As far back as 1990, the 
Congress of Numerically Small Peoples of the North (predecessor to RAIPON) called for the 
ratification ILO Convention 169 (Fondahl and Poelzer, 2003). The Convention remains 
important to Indigenous peoples around the world, including Inuit, when advocating for further 
policy and environmental protection standards. 
 In stark opposition to the actions of the regional administration in Chukotka, the Russian 
Federation signed onto the Council of Europe’s (CoE)23 Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities (FCPNM) on February 28, 1996, which “strengthened the 
guarantees of the legal status of Indigenous peoples of the North” (Kryazhkov, 2013). As a 
feature of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the FCPNM aligned Russian law with 
international law within the widely accepted international standards of human rights (Ibid). Still, 
Russia has not yet ratified the FCPNM. Prina (2016) explains that it is in part due to challenges 
with the “legal transplantation” of legal norms from the “West” into Russia’s domestic legal 
traditions, and the fact that pressure to ratify the FCPNM from the CoE is not applied equally 
among member states. For example, the CoE has never obliged France to align its domestic laws 
																																																								
23 The Council of Europe (CoE) is an international organization mandated to promote human rights, democracy and 
the rule of law in Europe. Russia is signatory to the CoE. See http://www.coe.int/en/. 
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with the treaty.  
 In 1993, Inuvialuit from Canada’s Northwest Territories sent a delegation to Chukotka at 
the request of Chukotka Autonomous Okrug’s Chairman, Vladimir Etylin. The visit was 
arranged through the 1992 Canada-Russia Agreement on Cooperation in the Arctic and the 
North, a continuation of the Canada-USSR Arctic Scientific Exchange Program (1984-1989). In 
January 1993, a memorandum of understanding (MOU) was signed in Provideniya by Roger 
Gruben, Chairman of the Inuvialuit Regional Corporation (IRC), and the Chairman of the Duma 
of the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug Vladimir Etylin and endorsed by the Government of the 
Northwest Territories (GNWT) and the Canadian Department of Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development (DIAND). The purpose of the MOU was to assess possible and ongoing 
commercial business ventures and opportunities between Yupiget and Inuvialuit, and to promote 
ongoing cultural and educational exchanges between both regions (Slipchenko & Hannigan, 
2010).  
Canadian researchers visited Iultinsk Raion in northwestern Chukotka in April 1999 to 
study the impact on Indigenous people of accelerated socio-economic change brought about by 
dissolution of USSR and the proceeding economic and political reforms (Ibid). These visits 
signaled the beginning of a series of exchanges that brought Yupiget into an array of 
international forums. It also marked the first international agreements signed between two 
subnational governments (Chukotka and GNWT) in Canada and Russia and preceded a robust 
series of exchanges between Russian and Canadian Inuit and other Indigenous peoples. These 
exchanges were in part made possible by utilizing the technical expertise and guidance of ICC 
Canada. 
 In March 1994, the ICC Executive Council was held in Anchorage, Alaska. The ICC 
resolved to play an active role within the UN to ensure Indigenous participation in the UN 
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Permanent Forum on Indigenous Peoples. In doing so, it secured the participation of Indigenous 
peoples in the formation of the UN’s Permanent Forum (Nuttall, 1998). The ICC was 
instrumental in promoting the recognition of the fundamental right of self-determination and the 
protection of land rights into a declaration at the ninth session of the Working Group on 
Indigenous Peoples’ in Geneva two years earlier (Ibid).  
 The first meeting of the Program Steering Committee of ICC Canada and RAIPON 
occurred at Kuujjuaq, Quebec, on February 26, 1995. The agenda included a special discussion 
concerning financial assistance for Russia’s ICC Executive to attend meetings in Canada 
(Slipchenko and Hannigan, 2010). YESC gained membership into the ICC in 1992 (Pelaudeix, 
2012). Chukotka’s Inuit organizations, YESC and ICC Russia, had representatives at the table 
with Minsters and Ministerial representatives from each of the Arctic’s eight sovereign states. 
 In December 1996, ICC Canada and DIAND officials arrived in Moscow with $1.9 
million to help Goskomsever establish policies and conduct institution building exercises in the 
Russian Far East (Ibid). A three year project titled, “Institution Building for Northern Russian 
Indigenous Peoples' Project” (INRIPP), funded by the Canadian International Development 
Agency (CIDA) and coordinated by ICC Canada was initiated in 1996. The purpose of the 
project was to enhance the partnership between RAIPON and Goskomsever to improve the 
economic situation facing northern Indigenous peoples and support RAIPON's efforts to 
represent Indigenous peoples at the national and international levels (ICC, 2014).  
 Growing awareness of issues related to the socio-economic and overall wellbeing of 
Inuit, particularly in Russia, led to increased scientific cooperation between Arctic states. In July 
1998, during the eighth Inuit Circumpolar Conference General Assembly in Nuuk, Greenland, a 
resolution passed to survey living conditions in the Arctic (Anderson, Kruse & Poppel, 2001). In 
addition to scientific exchanges between Yupiit and Yupiget, a visa-free travel regime was 
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negotiated for Yupiit to visit relatives who had long been separated by the Iron Curtain. These 
visits enhanced the awareness of Yupiget about their level of development in comparison to their 
Inuit kin in other parts of the circumpolar north (Sillanpää, 2005). 
 As previously mentioned, a severe humanitarian crisis in Chukotka affected Indigenous 
and non-Indigenous peoples alike. In 1998, a Canadian newspaper interviewed a Yupiget 
surgeon who described the rapid decrease in the health and welfare of her people (Bourgeois, 
1998). With marginal participation in a declining industrial development complex, subsistence 
hunting resumed as the primary occupation of many of Chukotka’s Indigenous peoples 
(Sillanpåå, 2005). In February 1999, YESC met with the Canadian Red Cross and ICC Canada to 
receive and distribute humanitarian aid to the villages in the Provideniya region. The following 
month representatives of YESC travelled to Nome, Alaska to participate in a meeting between 
the Pacific Walrus Commission and Nanooq Polar Bear Commission to initiate a joint project to 
study traditional knowledge about polar bear and aboriginal walrus hunting in Chukotka 
(Ainana, Zelensky & Bychkov, 2001). Such projects provided both the scientific data needed to 
manage shared resources among Inuit and maintain cultural practices and knowledge in danger 
of disappearing. 
Canada’s Bilateral Relationship with the Russian Federation 
 Recalling personal experiences in this long-standing bilateral relationship, one of my 
interviewees clearly articulated four main challenges associated with political development of 
Indigenous peoples in Chukotka as: an extremely poor state of the local economy; difficulty with 
“empowerment;” competition between Indigenous groups;24 and, the Russian government’s 
suspicious attitude towards the perceived or real influence of foreign governments and 
																																																								
24 This could not be confirmed by this research. 
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organizations. Indeed, these challenges are similar among Indigenous groups across Russia, but 
tend to differ according to the amount of natural resource production that occurs in the region 
where Indigenous groups are located. In Chukotka, there are few developed resources25 for 
reasons such as an extreme climate, a severe lack of or dilapidated infrastructure, low population 
density and a lack of geographic proximity to larger and more populated cities. There is even less 
resource development on the Yupiget traditional lands26 on the Chukchi Peninsula.   
 As part of Canada’s role within the former Canada-Russia Agreement on Scientific 
Exchange, Canada relayed some of its expertise in managing conflicts between Indigenous 
peoples and the resource development industry:  
In part, the impetus for harmonization in the northern context was driven on how to 
manage Indigenous concerns, rights claims, and interventions regarding resources and 
industrial development, particularly their adverse effects on traditional lands and 
subsistence activities. Within this context, Russian Indigenous peoples expressed a great 
interest in learning more about land claims, inherent right to self-government, approval of 
resource development projects, revenue sharing, co-management, compensation, etc. 
(Interview, October 2015). 
This interviewee later described how Canada framed its approach using corporate social 
responsibility as a way to reduce or mitigate conflicts between industry and Indigenous groups. 
Despite legislative protection for Indigenous rights, in the case of a conflict between industrial 																																																								
25 Kinross Gold Corp. is a successful Canadian enterprise with two operating gold mines in the Bilibinsky District of 
Chukotka. Multiple interviewees explained that Kinross as a success story in Canada-Russia cooperation and believe 
that Kinross is a model of social corporate responsibility in their hiring and operating procedures in terms of local 
and Indigenous labour and benefit sharing. Because Russian Yupiget are largely uninvolved in Kinross’ operations, I 
did not pursue this particular line of inquiry. However, in the broader context of Indigenous peoples and industrial 
development, the Kinross story could exemplify a more successful path to conflict resolution between Indigenous 
peoples and industrial development. 
26 ‘Traditional lands’ refers to territories where Russian Yupiget currently and/or historically practice subsistence 
activities. There are no territories currently protected by law for Yupiget use. 	
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and traditional land use, there are serious doubts regarding whether or not there is the political 
will or capacity to enforce such legislation to the detriment of company interests. Such conflict is 
exacerbated by the fact that the Russian government has a controlling interest in many of the 
largest resource development companies active in the Russian Far East. Thus, the perception is 
that Indigenous peoples’ interests are equal to the company’s interests. Where their rights are 
infringed upon with regard to the law, the state’s interest (ergo the company’s interest) 
supersedes any minority group’s interests. This interviewee added that the Russian Federation 
will always emphasize the recognition of traditional lands and traditional use, until Indigenous 
use conflicts with potential industrial use, then protection evaporates and rights are no longer 
protected.  
 With regard to empowerment, a key challenge is the different understandings of property 
rights:  
This is not an idea that is natural for the Soviet or Russian environment – the 
empowerment of local native populations. And then of course the recognition of property 
rights. It started [with] that very recognition of property rights. Well the thing I’ve seen 
over the years in terms of native populations is how do they claim property over the land? 
You have it in Canada and Alaska. I think it started in Yakutia where the first legislation 
(was it grazing rights for herders?) in a country where property rights [are] a sensitive 
subject. The idea that people [who] raise reindeer have a certain right to bring those 
reindeer over the land - it gives them a certain right over the use of the land. So that was an 
issue, but empowerment and property rights, as you are going through the issues – can they 
stand up to the regional and central powers (Interview, October 2015)?  
With little participation in resource development, and experiencing only the negative effects of 
development, Yupiget were caught in an economic conundrum exacerbated by the complex 
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connections between the four main challenges outlined earlier: a meager local economy, the 
empowerment of Indigenous peoples, competition between Indigenous groups, and resistance 
towards either real or perceived foreign authority. By the mid-2000s the reluctance to have a 
foreign authority meddling in Russia’s strategic interests gained political traction and eventually 
legislative protection. 
Conclusions 
 Glasnost and perestroika significantly altered the domestic political landscape in the 
USSR. Glasnost provided the impetus to freely exchange ideas and criticisms of the political and 
social order of the RSFSR. Perestroika guided the redesign of Soviet federalism. In the late-
1980s, the Soviet government was largely supportive of resolving the socio-economic challenges 
faced by Indigenous peoples in the RSFSR.  
 Through the transitional period new laws were created to protect Indigenous peoples’ 
rights to land and resources and to their traditional ways. Finally, Indigenous rights were 
included in the Constitution of the Russian Federation. However, the federal government lost its 
historically rigid control over the regions. Economic collapse across the emerging Russian 
Federation was especially damaging for Indigenous and marginalized peoples. Changes to the 
governorship of Chukotka removed the Indigenous representation from the local Duma, leaving 
Nazarov in and forcing Etylin out. While the federal government was progressive on Indigenous 
rights and activism, the regional government was less favourable to the idea of self-
determination for Chukotka’s Indigenous peoples. Due in part to the openness of the federal 
authorities and in response to the socio-economic crisis in Chukotka, a variety of Indigenous 
NGOs, ranging from local hunter’s associations to regional and national Indigenous NGOs were 
established to bring Indigenous peoples’ concerns to all levels of government.  
 Such drastic institutional change also welcomed the arrival of international NGOs to 
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meet a wide range of challenges including the provision of humanitarian aid, and the sharing of 
best practices of similar activist organizations. Yupiget were reintroduced to their Yupiit 
relatives and to the wider Inuit family across the circumpolar North. Over the course of the 
Soviet to post-Soviet transition, the RSFSR and Russian Federation became party to a number of 
international organizations such as the Arctic Council, and Russian Indigenous peoples were 
invited to participate in a number of international initiatives. The transformation from 
communism toward a democratic government allowed government agencies and NGOs in 
Alaska and Canada to work closely with the Russian government and Indigenous NGOs to 
resolve some of the challenges faced by Indigenous peoples and Chukotkans alike. 
 The Canadian government played a meaningful role in the development of Indigenous 
political organizations and activism, largely through the expertise of Canadian Inuit 
organizations such as ITK and ICC. The next chapter will follow the political development of 
Yupiget from the beginning of the 2000s to the present. Starting with the establishment of a new 
legal framework for Indigenous peoples in the Russian Federation, I will highlight changes in 
regional and federal governments and their effect on Indigenous activism and the bilateral 
relationship between Canada and the Russian Federation. 
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 Chapter 5: The (Re)Subjugation of Nascent Yupiget Institutions 2000-2015 
 While the late-Soviet and early post-Soviet periods witnessed a revival of Yupiget 
political and cultural agency, the last decade and a half has marked a return to the repression of 
Yupiget political, economic and social institutions. A recentralization of authority after the 
election of Vladimir Putin allowed the federal government to regain control over the regional 
“fiefdoms” created through the political and economic turmoil of the 1990s. In turn, the political 
activities of Indigenous NGOs drew increasing suspicion of foreign influence by the federal 
authorities. Legislation was introduced to control the nascent civil society and Indigenous 
activism established throughout the late-Soviet and transitional periods. Federal legislation, 
enacted to protect Indigenous rights, was slowly dismantled with amendments over the late 
2000s. International cooperation continued to occur, although participation in multilateral 
institutions replaced the bilateral cooperation that directly affected Yupiget civil society. A new 
federal law set limits on the amount of foreign assistance an NGO could receive, and eventually 
forced NGOs to choose between loyalty to the Russian state or their foreign funders. As power 
became increasingly recentralized in the Russian Federation, the tightening of legislation on civil 
society and a change in the relationship with the “West” slowed the rapid institutional 
development that occurred in the Soviet transitional period. 
Political Developments in the Contemporary Russian Federation 
 The new millennium began with two very important events that still affect Russia’s 
Indigenous peoples today. The first was a governmental decree passed on March 24, 2000 
entitled On the Unified Enumeration of Small Nations of the Russian Federation [No. 255].  This 
decree established an official list of Russia’s 40 “Indigenous peoples.” The second, and much 
more high profile, event was the election of Vladimir Putin as the second President of the 
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Russian Federation on May 7, 2000. Putin’s ascent to the highest echelons of power in the 
Russian Federation would mark the beginning of a series of changes to Russian foreign and 
domestic policies that significantly altered the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the 
Russian state. 
 The initial signs were good.  Shortly after his election, Putin signed into law two very 
important pieces of legislation that RAIPON officials helped to draft. In 2000 Putin signed the 
federal law On the General Principles for the Organization of Obshchiny of the Native Lesser-
Numbered Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation [FL-No. 
104] and the following year On the Territories of Traditional Nature Use by the Indigenous 
Numerically Small Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation 
[FL-No. 49] (Zadorin, 2012a, 2012b). With the addition of the 1999 federal law On Guarantees 
of the Rights of Small-Numbered Indigenous Peoples [FL-No. 82], the federal legislative 
framework for Indigenous rights in the Russian Federation was established (Zadorin, 2012a).  
 In 2004, however, a series of amendments to the Russian Constitution began to strip 
away some of the protections for Indigenous peoples established by the three previously 
mentioned federal statutes (Kryazhkov, 2013).  Additionally, an amendment to the Land Code 
removed the “right to preferential, free and non-competitive access to the land widely used by 
Indigenous peoples to continue their traditional economic activities” (Riekkinen, 2011: 110). The 
repeal of the federal law On the Basics of the State Regulation of Socio-Economic Development 
of the North of Russian Federation27 in 2004 is considered by at least one observer as a “denial 
by the state of the special policy considering the specifics of Northern regions and Indigenous 
peoples” (Kryazhkov, 2013: 146). Additionally, in July of 2005, legislation was enacted to create 
																																																								
27 On the Basics of the State Regulation of Socio-Economic Development of the North of Russian Federation [Ob 
Osnovac gosudarstvennogo regulirovania sotsial’no- ekonomicheskogoо razvitia Severa Rossiskoi Federatsii]. 
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the Public Chamber,28 an important institutional development that strengthened the central 
authorities’ influence over civil society. 
 In 2006, the Russian Federation adopted the federal law On Introducing Amendments 
Into Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation, a statute that is colloquially known as 
the Foreign Agents Law (Crotty and Hall, 2013). The Foreign Agents Law allowed state officials 
unrestricted access to all NGO activity, and forced NGOs accepting foreign funding to register 
with the state and report all financial and political activity (Crotty, Hall and Ljubownikow, 
2014). The result, in part, contributed to a distinctly “Russian” conception of civil society.  
 Two government policy position papers were released in February 2009 to introduce 
federal policies on the Russian Arctic landscape, and on Indigenous peoples: Basics of the State 
Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the Period until 2020 and Beyond and The 
Concept for the Sustainable Development of the Small Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia 
and the Far East of the Russian Federation. These policy papers outlined the Russian 
Federation’s strategies and goals related to sustainable development of Indigenous peoples and 
the Arctic (Riekkinen, 2011). Also in 2009, with changes to On Guarantees of the Rights of 
Indigenous Numerically-Small Peoples of the Russian Federation, two provisions were 
excluded: “the joint regulation of the legal regime of ownership, use and disposal of lands and 
the lands of traditional nature of historical and cultural places of residence [of Indigenous 
peoples]”; and, “the representation of [Indigenous peoples] in the legislative (representative) 
bodies of Subjects (Regions) of the Russian Federation and the representative bodies of local 
self-government (municipal bodies)” (Zadorin, 2012b). In March, the Russian High Court ruled 																																																								
28 The Public (Civic) Chamber is comprised of “prominent citizens of Russia, representatives of national, regional 
and interregional NGOs…Its purpose is to help citizens interact with government officials and local authorities in 
order to take into account the needs and interests of citizens, to protect their rights and freedoms in the process of 
shaping and implementing state policies, and to exercise public control over the activities of executive authorities” 
(Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation, 2017). 
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that “traditional lifestyle” should not include the incorporation of modern technologies such as 
motorboats, guns and snowmobiles for Indigenous subsistence activities, (Zadorin, 2012a) 
adding further and specific disadvantage to Indigenous peoples. As the first decade of Putin’s 
rule came to an end, the federal government’s legal protection for Indigenous peoples had been 
slowly stripped away to ensure unconstrained access for the type of natural resource extraction 
necessary to grow the Russian economy. 
 The end of the 2000s was marked by changes in leadership in the federal government. 
The 2007-2008 federal election cycle produced a switch between Russia’s Prime Minister and 
head of government Dmitri Medvedev, and Russia’s President and head of state Vladimir Putin, 
in line with the Russian Federation’s Constitution. After Putin’s first two terms, he was 
constitutionally required to spend a term out of the presidency so he endorsed his then Prime 
Minister Dmitiri Medvedev as United Russia’s candidate for President. Putin, in return, was 
appointed Prime Minister by president Medvedev. The literal switch between roles and leaders 
became known as a ruling “tandemocracy” (tandemokratiya) where Russia could stay the course 
of Putin’s reform strategies through his leadership of the United Russia Party (Hale and Colton, 
2009).  
 The Public Chamber hosted a roundtable in September 2011 on the legislative 
development of the rights of Indigenous peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East. They 
found that Russian legislation concerning Indigenous rights was regressing and federal 
government legislation (e.g. tax code, water code, land code) was often in conflict with 
legislative initiatives supported by the Federation Council (Yarovoy, Sergunin and Heininen 
2013). In April 2012, the Federation Council reported that an audit had revealed that federal 
money sent to the regions as required by the 2009 Concept for the Sustainable Development was 
spent inefficiently and resulted in no benefits to Indigenous peoples. Moreover, legislation to 
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amend the tax code, water code and land code was never adopted (Ibid). While jurisdictional 
disagreements between federal and regional legislators persisted, Vladimir Putin easily won the 
2012 presidential election, regardless of accusations of widespread vote rigging and fraud 
(Russia Today, 2012). His return to the presidency signaled an immediate increase in the rate of 
centralization of authority in the Russian Federation. 
 In 2012, the Russian government approved the allocation of federal budget subsidies to 
the sum of 240 million rubles to support the economic and social development of Indigenous 
peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East (Arctic Info, 2012). Contrarily, federal legislators 
approved further legislation that required NGOs with “political activities” and “foreign funding” 
to register as “foreign agents” and submit quarterly reports of their financial activities to the 
authorities (Crotty, Hall and Ljubownikow, 2014). By March 2013, the Moscow Times reported 
that federal authorities were being urged to modify the state policy on Indigenous peoples by law 
makers, cabinet ministers and representatives of 40 ethnic minorities from the Russian North, Far 
East and Siberia (Kravtsova, 2013). While an official at the Ministry of Regional Development 
decried the difficulty in trying to get the Finance Ministry to increase funding, he also heralded 
that a 3-year growth in the Indigenous population of 6% indicated efficiency in Moscow’s 
policies towards its Indigenous peoples (Ibid).  
 In December of 2013, the State Duma adopted a bill amending the Federal Act On 
Specially Protected Conservation Areas, which stripped Indigenous peoples’ TTNUs of any 
effective legislative protection by removing them from the designation of “Specially Protected 
Conservations Areas,” a status they held until then (IWGIA, 2014). Furthermore, Russia’s 
Constitutional Court ruled that the Foreign Agents Law did not contradict the Russian 
constitution and that labeling NGOs as “foreign agents” is aimed at “important public interests” 
(International Centre for Not-for-profit Law, 2016). These developments signaled an increase of 
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the federal government’s power and authority over the lives of Russia’s Indigenous peoples.  
 Throughout 2014 and 2015, developments regarding the Foreign Agents Law and the war 
in Ukraine contributed to the restriction of movement of both people and ideas across Russia. 
The Ukrainian province of Crimea was “reunified”29 with Russia following the results of a 
hurried and controversial referendum. The “annexation”30 of Crimea caused a great deal of 
international turmoil and harmed already tense relations between Russia and the West.  Ensuing 
sanctions imposed by the United States, Canada and the European Union increased tensions and 
further widened the gap.  Organizations across Russia were systematically labeled “foreign 
agents” including a human rights organization in Murmansk, and the Nenets’ organization 
Yasavey Manzara  (Pettersen, 2014; 2015).  
 By December 2015, the first application of the Foreign Agents Law in Chukotka occurred 
when the Chukotka Association of Traditional Sea Mammal Hunters (ChAZTO) was asked to 
voluntarily register as an “organization performing the function of foreign agents” with the 
Ministry of Justice (IWGIA, 2014). IWGIA (2014) reported that the “Deputy Head of the 
Administration of Justice for Magadan Region and Chukotka Autonomous District, the chief of 
the division on NGO affairs and an expert from the same department” summoned Head of 
Administration for ChAZTO Eduard Zdor to a meeting where they pleaded with Zdor to 
voluntarily register ChAZTO as a foreign agent. He declined, claiming his organization received 
foreign funding for scientific research and their activities were not of a political nature. He was 
cautioned that he would be subject to torment and random checks by authorities and would be 
forced to comply in the end because ChAZTO was the only local organization that could be 
identified as a foreign agent (Ibid). Mikkelsen (2015) noted that representatives from ChAZTO 
																																																								
29 According to Russian perspectives. 
30 According to Western perspectives.	
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were vocal critics of planned oil and gas development near Wrangell Island and that the 
participation of an Indigenous peoples’ organization on an international environmental initiative 
being considered “political activity” is evidence of increasing state pressure. 
Political Developments in Chukotka 
 Chukotka’s governor Aleksandr Nazarov was investigated in October 2000 before the 
regional elections for illegally selling fishing quotas, conducting illegal real estate dealings and 
evading tax and customs payments on oil delivered to Chukotka under a government program 
intended to ensure sufficient winter supplies in the region (Uzelac, 2000). One of Russia’s 
powerful oligarchs with close ties to the Kremlin, Roman Abramovich, ran against Nazarov in 
the gubernatorial election. Abramovich was elected Governor of Chukotka in December 2000, 
and Vladimir Etylin, a Chukchi, and former Head of Administration for Chukotka, replaced 
Abramovich as Chukotka’s representative in the federal Duma (Gray, 2001). Abramovich was 
more supportive of Indigenous peoples in Chukotka, and his election win brought hope that 
conditions would improve for Chukchi and Yupiget alike (Nunatsiaq News, March 9, 2001). 
 In Chukotka, Abramovich faced pressure to increase the services and infrastructure 
ignored for so long by the Nazarov administration.  Russian authorities suggested liquidating 382 
of 1400 settlements, but Abramovich, with his cadre of bright, young professionals from 
Moscow, initiated a voluntary resettlement program open to all long-term residents of Chukotka. 
The program ultimately failed and was suspended two years later, mainly because the young and 
economically active part of the population left while only pensioners and Indigenous peoples 
remained (Thompson, 2002). The sudden shift in the demographic makeup of the population 
changed the political, economic and social landscape in Chukotka, highlighting the need for new 
solutions. 
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 Also in 2002, Abramovich established the “Indigenous Representatives Council” within 
the Chukotka Duma in accordance with Article 1 of the federal law On Guarantees of the Rights 
of Small-Numbered Indigenous Peoples (Diatchkova, 2010). The Council consisted of two 
Indigenous representatives in the Chukotka Duma, but largely failed to resolve the key 
challenges faced by Indigenous peoples in Chukotka (Ibid). Abramovich introduced policies that 
led to increased outmigration of Chukotka’s non-Indigenous population, and modernized much 
of the dilapidated infrastructure in and around Anadyr. He was more supportive of foreign 
exchanges and cooperation and more sympathetic to the collective problems of Chukotka’s 
Indigenous peoples, who largely favoured Abramovich’s governorship and the international 
attention it garnered.  
In 2005, a roundtable was held in Anadyr on “The Indigenous Movement: Issues and 
Tasks” It revealed that many Indigenous peoples in Chukotka were unaware of their legally 
enshrined rights, and how the weakening of those rights would affect subsistence lifestyles. It 
was agreed that a major challenge in Chukotka was the absence of information and the need for 
greater dissemination efforts regarding federal and regional legislation on Indigenous rights 
(Diatchkova, 2010.) For example, many hunters were unaware of, or did not care about, Russian 
laws that should influence their traditional and subsistence practices (Ibid). 
 In 2008, Roman Abramovich announced that he would resign as the Governor of 
Chukotka, but was reelected to his seat as Chukotka’s representative in the State Duma. 
President Medvedev appointed then Deputy Governor Roman Kopin to replace Abramovich in 
the interim, and later to the permanent job; a move supported by local legislators (Wilson and 
Kormos, 2015). Yupiget have benefited from Kopin’s efforts to secure periodic targeted funding 
to purchase marine hunting supplies and equipment so desperately needed for survival on the 
Chukchi Peninsula. 
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 Yupiget survival is intricately tied to their ability to subsistence hunt for large sea-
mammals. Inuit hunting and whaling, however, is largely subsidized by the state. In 2011, a 
scientific committee at the International Whaling Commission (IWC) declared that the Eastern 
Gray whale was indeed in a healthy state (Borodin et al., 2012). A four-year federal program to 
support Chukchi and Yupiget whaling delivered fuel, equipment and a new Russian satellite 
navigation system (RIA Novosti, 2011). A report by the Barents Observer suggested that the 
federal government subsidies for Chukotka are a seven to eight times higher than in Russia’s 
poorest regions (Staalesen, 2011). While a healthy whale population and the means to harvest 
were certainly good news for Yupiget, the region’s socio-economic situation was still in decline.  
In July 2012, the IWC renewed subsistence whaling quotas for Iñupiat in Alaska and for 
Chukchi and Yupiget in Chukotka (Stern, 2013). 
 While federal authorities were increasingly retreating from protecting Indigenous 
minorities, the administration in Chukotka increased its efforts to better the socio-economic 
position of its Indigenous peoples. In February 2013, nearly 72 million rubles were allocated to 
the development of sea mammal hunting in Chukotka, with 64.7 million rubles to be paid to 
hunters as subsidies (Arctic Info, February 18, 2013).  In return, hunters were tasked with 
providing monthly reports on the use of resources and quarterly reports on the achievement of 
efficiency targets on the use of those subsidies (Ibid). Chukotka Governor Roman Kopin met 
with Putin in Moscow to appeal to the Kremlin to make adjustments to the air travel subsidies 
program and allow the regions to “determine and expand its parameters” (Arctic Info, March 12, 
2013).   
Civil Society and Indigenous Activism in the Contemporary Russian Federation 
 In February 2000, YESC organized a “Yupik Assembly” in Provideniya where a new 
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Constitution was ratified. YESC officially applied for membership within RAIPON (Ainana, 
2001; Ainana, Zelensky & Bychkov, 2001). Because RAIPON was an officially registered NGO, 
YESC was granted NGO status under the Russian Constitution one year later.  At the fourth 
Congress of RAIPON in 2006, representatives discussed land property rights for Indigenous 
peoples, participation in regional executive and legislative agencies and the legal status of small 
nations (Diatchkova, 2001). A Charter for Indigenous Peoples of the North was also discussed 
and adopted (Laletin, 2012). From the mid-2000s on RAIPON refocused its efforts towards 
opposing government attempts to amend and weaken the existing Indigenous legislation 
framework, and attempting to address government’s failure to implement the Charter’s 
provisions (Rohr, 2014).  
 On November 1, 2012, the federal Ministry of Justice, due to alleged non-compliance 
with Article 42 of the federal law On Public Organizations, suspended RAIPON’s activities, 
mirroring the fate of YESC a decade prior. They cited RAIPON’s failure to register each of its 
regional constituent offices as “legal entities” as the reason for the suspension (George, 2012b). 
Two weeks later, at the meeting of the Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs) of the Arctic Council in 
Harparanda, Sweden, participating SAOs and Permanent Participants released a joint statement:  
The Senior Arctic Officials and the Permanent Participants of the Arctic Council express 
concern about the absence of RAIPON from the work of the Arctic Council as a result of 
the decision taken by the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation to suspend the 
activities of RAIPON until April 2013 and as an interim measure request the Senior Arctic 
Official of the Russian Federation in close cooperation with RAIPON and the Ministry of 
Justice of the Russian Federation to facilitate, as appropriate, the fulfillment of RAIPON’s 
important role as a Permanent Participant in the Arctic Council (Ibid). 
In March of 2013, the federal Ministry of Justice approved amendments to RAIPON’s statutes, 
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allowing it to officially resume its operations (Staalesen, 2013). The news came just in time for 
RAIPON’s seventh Congress in Salekhard, Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug throughout the 
last week of March. During the Congress, the Barents Observer reported “irregularities” in the 
voting system that elected United Russia Deputy Grigoriy Ledkov as President of RAIPON 
(Nilsen, 2013). Choosing a member of the governing United Russia party with its strong 
connections to President Putin as its leader effectively silenced the RAIPON’s Indigenous voice. 
The loss of allies in the State Duma was amplified by Roman Abramovich’s resignation as a 
Deputy and Speaker of the regional legislature (Siberian Times, 2013).  
Immediately, RAIPON’s tone changed. One interviewee described the shift in attitude 
from RAIPON’s leadership post-election: 
Honestly, I’ve never seen a political leader so unengaged. You could just tell he was 
mimicking the lines of what he was told to say. There was no contribution as to items he 
wanted Canada to engage on with Indigenous peoples. It was almost “anything the 
Ministry [of Regional Development] is suggesting is good for us.” When you see him 
wake up, it was only about his trips to Arctic Council or Yellowknife. That was the 
engagement of him coming here. There was no dynamism at all (Interview, Ottawa, 
October 2015). 
Other interviewees echoed concerns about the unengaged leadership of RAIPON since the 2012 
elections and our discussions raised two great questions about the future of this organization: 
“Does RAIPON compete with ICC (Russia) for resources?” and “What effect does this have on 
Indigenous peoples’ level of engagement at home and abroad?” Another interviewee further 
explained that as federal government deputies are indirectly appointed into leadership positions 
in Indigenous organizations such as RAIPON, the progressive work accomplished through the 
bilateral relationship is undone, and Indigenous issues take a back seat to industrial interests.  
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 Canada and Russia are home to a large number of Indigenous peoples, each with their 
own histories, languages and claims to the land and resources. In Russia, this challenge has been 
met with exceptionally strong leadership, one of RAIPON’s key assets until quite recently. 
Interviewees identified the leadership of brothers Pavel and Rodion Sulyandziga and Sergei 
Kharyuchi as the driving force behind Indigenous activism within the Russian Federation. As 
Indigenous leaders and activists, they secured political support in terms of offices and 
membership in committees and arms-length government organizations such as the Public 
Chamber. Furthermore, they had a good reputation within a number of international 
organizations. When the political support from the Russian authorities decreased, so did 
RAIPON’s effectiveness. One interviewee explained that RAIPON’s success and effectiveness 
in international institutions is dependent on its leadership. Another interviewee described 
RAIPON’s relationship with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as amicable because 
RAIPON was perceived as successful and engaging at the United Nations:  
RAIPON was the teacher’s pet, so to speak, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs because it 
allowed Russia to sort of show off at the United Nations that they were looking after their 
[Indigenous] populations. Look we have with us here a representative of [Indigenous 
peoples]. So the relationship with the Foreign Ministry was great. There was no issue there 
in that sense…RAIPON represents the native populations of Russia and it has a good 
relationship with Foreign Affairs (Interview, October 2015). 
RAIPON’s leadership, however, clashed with the Minister of Regional Development, an 
executive department that this interviewee referred to as “unmanageable.”31 The result was a 
																																																								
31 The initial workload at the Ministry of Regional Development was too broad and far-reaching at its establishment 
in 2004. It was responsible for social and economic development of the federal subjects and municipalities of Russia, 
the Far East and Arctic, and Indigenous peoples and minorities. It was abolished in 2014 by Presidential decree and 
its responsibilities divided up among other Ministries. 
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very complicated relationship with federal authorities. 
 While some of the interviewees described RAIPON’s future as bleak, there is some hope, 
given the important role that youth are playing in this organization. But such optimism is 
cautious at best. One interviewee noted: 
I think one of the agents of change within RAIPON are [sic] the youth. For example, the 
youth delegation at the Arctic Council has been fantastic. They’re an up and coming… A 
lot of older guys had their foot in collectivization, had a stake in it, somehow co-opted. But 
some very dynamic people came out of it. They were very strong and capable at the 
RAIPON meetings and congresses, a real investment for the future. Moreover, their 
engagement on Indigenous issues over the past few years effectively built their capacity to 
make the transition to drive RAIPON’s agenda in the coming decades. However, given the 
recent political changes, and with it, the demise of RAIPON, youth engagement has been 
derailed for the foreseeable future. This is a tragic loss in sustaining RAIPON’s capacity to 
continue to champion the cause of Indigenous peoples of the Russian north, domestically 
and internationally (Interview, October, 2015). 
There is significant evidence to question whether RAIPON will remain effective in the future as 
an organization dedicated to the development of Russia’s Indigenous minorities. Its challenges 
are similar to many of the regional and local Indigenous NGOs in Russia. One of its more 
complex challenges is whether it can truly represent all of Russia’s Indigenous groups. From the 
suspicious results of its last election, to its decreased engagement in how it conducts its business 
at the international level, RAIPON may no longer represent the interests of Russia’s Indigenous 
peoples and, more specifically, Yupiget.  
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International Cooperation in the Contemporary Russian Federation 
 Article 15 (4) of the Russian Constitution broadly describes how to reconcile Russian law 
with its international commitments: 
[T]he generally recognized principles and norms of international law and the international 
treaties of the Russian Federation shall be a component part of its legal system. If an 
international treaty of the Russian Federation establishes other rules than those provided by 
the law, the rules of the international treaty shall apply (Constitution of the Russian 
Federation, 2017 [1993]). 
Therefore, international legal frameworks are not only accepted by the Russian Federation, but 
are also woven into its judiciary and domestic legal frameworks. Increasingly over the last 
decade, the Russian Federation has referenced the application32 (or misapplication) international 
treaties in its foreign policy statements. Additionally, the international legal regime is 
increasingly taking non-governmental structures and institutions under its jurisdiction 
(Marochkin, 2009). While Russia’s domestic laws are unsupportive of NGOs concerned with 
Indigenous and environmental issues, Russia is still engaged with its neighbours on such issues 
as they relate to the Arctic. An example of this trend can be found in the inner workings of the 
Arctic Council.   
 The Arctic Council is an important forum for the cooperation and mutual benefit of the 
eight Arctic Nations: the United States, Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Iceland, Norway, 
Sweden, Finland and the Russian Federation. The work of the Arctic Council includes 
transnational binding agreements such as the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and 
Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic (2011) and the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine 																																																								
32 For example, the justification for the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is purported by the Russian Federation as 
illegal in terms of International law. The Russian Federation’s excursions into Ukraine and annexation/reunification 
with Crimea are purported by the US and its NATO allies as in terms of international law.  
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Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (2013). Much of the Arctic Council’s 
work is centered on environmental stewardship and sustainable development projects between 
Arctic states in a variety of areas such as climate and environment, oceans, biodiversity, Arctic 
peoples etc. Because such agreements have a distinct effect on the political, economic and social 
development of Indigenous peoples, the Arctic Council allows six representative Indigenous 
organizations to sit at the decision-making table as Permanent Participants and offer comment 
and advice to policy-makers during the process.  
 The last decade of the 20th century found Chukotka isolated, politically and 
economically, from Moscow, as much of the human capital built up during the Soviet period left 
Chukotka. At this time, however, Chukotka’s Indigenous peoples, particularly Yupiget, became 
more involved with Indigenous peoples and Inuit throughout the circumpolar north, thereby 
opening up a new support network for Indigenous activists. In June 2000, the “Canadian Inuit 
Initiative” was launched to raise $150,000 for Chukotka’s Inuit from ICC Canada (ICC, 2000). 
The purpose was to help Yupiget to survive the immediate effects of the humanitarian crisis in 
Chukotka, and also to provide socio-economic development initiatives that benefitted both 
Canadian and Russian Indigenous peoples. In July 2000, the INRIPP II project, a continuation of 
the project initiated in 1996, began with funding from CIDA and coordination and technical 
support provided by ICC Canada. 
 In February 2001, the ICC presented a cheque for $21,000 to the Alaska North Slope 
Borough to help Yupiget buy fuel and equipment for subsistence hunting activities (ICC, 2001). 
Later that year, Yupiit and Yupiget gathered in Nome, Alaska to establish closer relations 
between the two regions (Nunatsiaq News, June 29, 2001). Against the backdrop of an 
increasingly difficult relationship between Indigenous activists and the Russian state, bilateral 
and multilateral relations persisted. On August 15, 2002, the international Inuit community met 
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in Kuujjuaq, Quebec for the ninth ICC General Assembly. Outgoing ICC President Aqqaluq 
Lynge lamented the poor showing from Russia (12 of 35 expected delegates) because of 
communication issues between Moscow and Washington. He was quoted in the Nunatsiaq News 
saying, “I’m sure that if we had an effective office in Chukotka itself, those problems that we ran 
into would have been avoided.” (Wilkin, 2002). Article 21 of the Kuujjuaq Declaration pledged 
to intensify support for Yupiget and other Indigenous peoples in the Russian Far East (Kuujjuaq 
Declaration, 2002). 
  The 10th General Assembly of the ICC was held in July 2006 in Utqiaġvik, Alaska. 
Article 9 of the Utqiaġvik Declaration urged the ICC’s Executive Council to develop initiatives 
to promote further cooperation between Russia and the ICC in order to develop opportunities for 
Yupiget (ICC, 2006). However, while the regime of international cooperation between Russia 
and its Arctic Council counterparts continued to develop and grow, the tightening of domestic 
laws regarding Russia’s Indigenous peoples continued to limit opportunities for Yupiget political 
development in Chukotka.  
In Chukotka, local journalist and Yupik activist Tatiana Achirgina was elected President 
of ICC Russia in 2009, thereby securing a Russian seat on ICC’s Executive Council. In 2010, 
ICC General Assembly was held in Nuuk Greenland, and was attended by Achirgina. One 
outcome of the conference was the framework for a circumpolar Inuit health strategy (Nunatsiaq 
News, 2010). Additionally, Article 49 of the Nuuk Declaration called for further support of ICC 
Russia’s Chukotka office (Arctic Council, 2011). Also in 2012, a delegation from ICC Alaska, 
Canada and Greenland visited ICC Russia in Anadyr (George, 2012a). The visit was in part to 
host an ICC Executive Council meeting, and for the formal signing of a MOU between the 
Government of Chukotka and the Association of Indigenous Peoples of Chukotka (Drum, 2012). 
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Canada’s Bilateral Relationship with the Russian Federation  
 The deep economic recession in Russia during the 1990s changed the operational context 
of Canada-Russia cooperation. Originally, cooperation was rooted in reciprocity; each side pays. 
When that changed and the Russian Federation could no longer provide financial support, the 
context changed. Additionally, each side had a different approach to involvement of Indigenous 
organizations in the project. In Canada, the federal government focused on capacity building, 
land claims, the impacts of colonization, resource development, self-government and Indigenous 
peoples’ rights, despite the potential for conflict with the Russian government’s objectives. 
Russia’s approach amounted to providing limited funding through the regional authorities for 
Indigenous leaders and government officials to travel to international gatherings.  
 By the early to mid-2000s, the evolving domestic political situations in both Canada and 
the Russian Federation led to changes in their overall relationship. The creation of the federal 
district system in 200033 and subsequent demise of Goskomsever illustrated the return of the 
power vertikal, allowing the federal government to increase its influence on the regions and 
“bring the presidential authority to the local level” (Wheeler, 2011). In Canada, there was a shift 
in foreign policy goals in the Arctic34. The Canadian International Development Agency35 
(CIDA) shifted its emphasis within their ongoing international projects from poverty reduction to 
increasing trade and investment. There was a new focus on Indigenous-to-Indigenous 
community engagement with support from the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade (DFAIT). One interviewee described the shift as follows: 																																																								
33 On May 18, 2000, Vladimir Putin established seven Federal Districts, each comprised of several Federal Subjects 
(republics, provinces, districts) in order to provide federal oversight of the implementation of the Russian 
Constitution and federal legislation. 
34 Noted in Canadian foreign policy documents “Northern Dimension of Canada’s Foreign Policy” (2005) and 
“Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada’s Northern Strategy Abroad” (2010). 
35 CIDA was eventually merged into the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) 
in 2013. 	
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CIDA withdrew from technical assistance…leaving the work in the Russian north 
incomplete. The other thing was increasing centralized government engagement in regional 
economic development and wanting to control international engagement in the Russian 
north, including greater scrutiny of the nature and breadth of our projects. We ended up 
with a new approach to engagement: much more formal and divided into two-year cycles 
with extensive vetting of our projects (Interview, October 2015). 
At the same time, Russia began to utilize a “regional development” approach; although between 
Russia and Canada there were differences in opinion over what constitutes regional 
development. Another interviewee explained: 
There is to be some federal money spent in the regions so you can develop the regions. I 
had a big dispute with one of my colleagues who had been in the Far East and had told me 
there had been some development in the region. But no, basically, they would send 
somebody from Moscow and they would collect the resources and that’s it. The “Ministry 
of Gold,” as they used to call it, opens a mine. They take what they want and they close the 
mine. There’s no regional development understanding (Interview, October, 2015). 
The difference in approach likely disproportionately affected Yupiget and other Indigenous 
peoples, and contributed to the ongoing social and economic challenges in Chukotka. The 
context changed again during the 2014 Ukrainian crisis. One interviewee recalled: 
We are now faced with a situation whereby existing projects with Russia in the Arctic have 
been held hostage and become collateral damage in sustaining circumpolar cooperation as 
a consequence of Russia’s response to the West’s criticisms of its actions in Ukraine. For 
example [another interviewee] may have pointed you to recent Russian reaction over a 
project we supported last year, now viewing the Nenets organization as “foreign agents” 
and cut off funding. Everybody’s skittish now, understandingly [sic], they don’t want to 
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exacerbate the situation of Indigenous peoples and are cautious about their levels of 
engagement (Interview, October, 2015). 
Institutional changes in Russia occurred simultaneously with those in Canada. The Russian 
Ministry of Regional Development closed in 2004, and its responsibility for the Arctic and 
Indigenous peoples was downloaded to other Ministerial portfolios. The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, in constant competition under the 
increasingly centralized control of the Kremlin, fought for control over international engagement 
within the void left by Goskomsever.  
 Strategic changes to DIAND also took them out of the business of providing assistance to 
Russian Indigenous peoples. One prominent Russian political leader even voiced his concern 
with the decision to move DIAND in a new direction. An interviewee commented: 
At the political level, as a result of a government expenditure review, the [scientific 
exchange] program was shut down. A message went out that DIAND was no longer in 
business. Nikolaev, the former governor of the Sakha Republic and former parliamentary 
Speaker met with our Deputy Minister, expressing his concern about this decision, given 
the prominent role Aboriginal Affairs had been playing in the Russian north…However, 
[the scientific exchange program] continued to be challenged by the government 
expenditure review exercise, including internal department reviews questioning how our 
international engagement was consistent with our domestic policy and objectives 
(Interview, October, 2015). 
The Canadian government’s objectives with regards to Russia in the Arctic had changed from 
that of bilateral cooperation and developmental aid, to protecting Arctic sovereignty and 
security, in part due to Russia’s actions in Ukraine. Bilateral exchanges between Canada and 
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Russia ceased to exist. Canada is no longer engaged with Russia36 outside of multilateral 
engagement through international forums such as the Arctic Council and the United Nations.  
 One of the successes of the scientific exchange program was its focus on regional 
development through region-to-region engagement. A hallmark of this engagement was the 
implementation of INRIPP phases I (1996-2000) and II (2000-2005). According to one of my 
interviewees, INRIPP I and II “exposed the Russians to opportunities in Canada to learn about 
co-management, small business development and a range of opportunities to transfer these best 
practices to Russia.” INRIPP included a humanitarian mission to Chukotka where ICC Canada 
worked with its counterpart in Chukotka to provide much needed humanitarian assistance to 
Russian Yupiget and other Indigenous peoples of Chukotka (Wilson, 2007). However, by the 
time the Canada-Russia Northern Development Partnership Program (NORDEP) project came to 
fruition, the context in which the work would be carried out had changed in both countries. 
 It is important to note that international cooperation has had extremely positive outcomes 
for Russian Yupiget, not only in terms of cultural preservation, but also in terms of access to 
wage labour, experience with resource management and developing civil society. Recalling the 
effect of international cooperation in Chukotka a Yupik activist recalled:  
We began to take an active role in the activities of various international organizations 
functioning in the Arctic. A lot of organizations have emerged here; their activities are 
aimed at the revival of national cultures (quoted in Sillanpåå, 2005: 571).  
A member of the presidium of the Association of Indigenous Minorities37 echoed these 
sentiments: 
[Yupiget] have even been admitted to an international non-governmental organization, the 
																																																								
36 At the time of the interviews, Canada had no bilateral engagement with Russia. 
37 RAIPON’s institutional predecessor. 
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ICC. While local authorities may not pay any real attention to the statements of the ICC, it 
does exert some influence in that a small minority people like [Yupiget] has membership in 
an international organization that represents four countries (quoted in Sillanpåå, 2005: 
571). 
The combined outcome of international cooperation on Russian Yupiget was the replacement of 
state subsidization with a series of one-off projects and aid packages from multiple sources 
across the Arctic. Such projects and assistance helped Yupiget cope with the challenges caused 
by the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Such assistance, however, is now threatened by 
implementation of the Foreign Agents Law. Looking ahead, it is unclear if such activities are 
sustainable, given the context in which Russia and Canada changed the focus of their priorities in 
the Arctic. Furthermore, ICC’s mandate to provide assistance and further support to ICC Russia 
is no longer discussed in publications such as ICC Canada’s annual reports and ICC executive 
declarations. 
 One of the hallmarks of Canadian influence on RAIPON was the Russian Indigenous 
Training Centre. One interviewee described it as “one of RAIPON’s major achievements,” and 
characterized its value: “They used that framework and model to build capacity, sharing best 
practices thematically, whether it was education, health. It was really cool. They took charge. 
They did it effectively. And all that – it’s gone.” Another interviewee lamented: “The longer the 
communication between Russia and Canada is severed, the harder it will be to resume where it 
left off.” With such a long history of cooperation throughout the Cold War and Russia’s post-
Soviet transformation, it is difficult to speculate on the future of bilateral cooperation between 
our countries on Indigenous and Arctic issues. One participant explained: 
So future cooperation would be of a completely different nature than we used to have. We 
could use the “Indigenous card” – the ICC and the Inuit are together – but now they’ve 
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killed those institutions that [were] built and all those players are completely [replaced] by 
the Ledkovs38 of this world who are in the Duma. How will Russia face Canada on the 
issue of Indigenous peoples? It’s going to be really difficult. It’s going to be a completely 
different relationship. And I can’t even imagine, especially at a bilateral level, how it could 
look without Indigenous people involved and engaged (Interview, October 2015). 
Given the bleak prospects for bilateral relations to resume, another interviewee stated: “So from 
a circumpolar perspective, the only game left in town is the Arctic Council framework, albeit 
with state appointed and controlled Indigenous representatives from the Russian North.” Political 
and legal developments for Yupiget are interwoven in the connections between civil society, the 
state, and particularly in this case, at the level of international cooperation among countries of 
the circumpolar north. 
Conclusions 
 The election of Vladimir Putin marked a change in the federal government’s policy 
towards Indigenous peoples. Initially, the federal government appeared favourably inclined to 
resolving Indigenous peoples’ challenges as evidenced by the introduction of the three federal 
laws regarding Indigenous rights in 1999, 2000 and 2001. However, the recentralization of 
power and authority in Moscow led the federal government to switch its position regarding 
Indigenous rights to prioritize large resource extraction activities over Indigenous peoples’ 
challenges. Furthermore, the federal government began to crack down on organized opposition 
in the governmental and non-governmental sectors. Increasingly, the Abramovich administration 
in Chukotka, counter to the direction of the federal government, advanced regional policies on 
Indigenous peoples, including electoral representation and international cooperation – policies 
																																																								
38 Grigory Ledkov’s election as RAIPON’s president occurred under irregular circumstances, and has changed the 
dynamic of RAIPON’s international engagement. 
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the Nazarov administration worked directly against.  
 The Russian Federation’s substantial control over civil society began with a piece of 
legislation now known as the Foreign Agents Law. It created suspicion among the general 
population about the day-to-day operations and financing arrangements of domestic NGOs, 
making international cooperation on Indigenous issues very difficult. Local and national NGOs 
received more and more scrutiny as the Foreign Agents Law became more and more restrictive. 
By Putin’s third term, local, national and international NGOs became ineffective at pursuing 
their respective agendas, whether political or not. Indigenous activism and civil society had 
largely subsided. 
 Canada’s relationship with the Russian Federation underwent changes on both sides as 
well. The bilateral exchanges with the Russian Federation that had largely sustained joint 
projects such as INRIPP I and II ended when the Ukrainian crisis froze relations completely. My 
interviewees lamented the abruptness of the change and its impact on Indigenous peoples from 
both Canada and Russia as almost tragic because all of the progress they made was for naught. 
The result is the reversing of the forces of institutional change favourable to advancing Yupiget 
political autonomy and self-determination. The next chapter will use historical institutionalism to 
explain the changes in institutional forces throughout each period and their effect on Yupiget 
political autonomy. 
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Chapter 6: An Historical Institutionalist Perspective on Yupiget Political Autonomy 
 Institutions include a variety of formal and informal procedures, processes, norms and 
conventions and are embedded in the organizational and power structures of society. They 
involve both purposefully created institutions tasked with providing and/or promoting a number 
of public policy initiatives, and the formal rules structuring relations between such institutions 
and society. In the preceding chapters, I described a variety of institutional developments during 
the Soviet and post-Soviet periods, from the local to international levels and within both 
government and civil society. In this chapter, I will further examine these institutional 
arrangements using the theoretical framework described in Chapter Two. 
 In this chapter, I will employ the tools of historical institutionalism to explain why 
Yupiget lag behind other Inuit in acquiring political autonomy and self-determination. The basis 
of my argument is that the institutional norms established by state authorities throughout the 
Soviet period continue to impact Yupiget today in the Russian Federation. Because the 
construction, maintenance and adaptation of institutions occur over time, the preceding chapters 
highlighted the “concrete temporal processes” that established the opposing forces of 
institutional development in the Russian Federation (Thelen, 1999).  This chapter will identify 
three critical junctures and explicate the resulting path dependencies in order to explain how 
opposing forces have affected Yupiget political, economic and social development in the Russian 
Federation. 
 Critical junctures and path dependencies, as articulated by Thelen (1999), include two 
main elements. The first is that a critical juncture occurs when a choice is made during the 
formation of an institution that sets it down a different developmental path. The second is that 
institutions continue to evolve due to a number of external and internal factors, though such 
evolution is constrained by previous institutional choices. Critical junctures include key events, 
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crises, key decisions and/or ideas whose result then limits the range of alternative processes or 
trajectories thereafter. The Russian Federation has gone through a period of rapid institutional 
development and uncertainty in the post-Soviet period. Building new institutions to accompany 
new political realities in Russia has proven problematic. In fact, much of Russia’s new political 
and civil institutions closely resemble their Soviet predecessors, although it is unclear if this is 
by design or the result of doing what is familiar. However, the Russian Federation is actively 
involved in international institutional development and is a key actor in the institutional design 
of the Arctic cooperation regime, even though international priorities are often at odds with the 
Russian Federation’s domestic priorities. Yupiget institutional development demonstrates the 
plight of an Indigenous minority caught in the intersection of these two paths.  
The Subjugation of Yupiget Political Institutions 1923-1985 
 The establishment of Soviet rule in Chukotka is perhaps a rather obvious but extremely 
significant critical juncture for Yupiget political development. Soviet policies towards 
Indigenous peoples had a substantial impact on the future prospects for Yupiget to exercise self-
determination and political autonomy. Almost every aspect of Yupik life was transformed and 
their complete subordination to the state occurred rapidly. New institutions tasked with 
governance and law-making swept across Chukotka in order for the Soviet authorities to build a 
model socialist society. Goskomsever was established to ensure central oversight and blanket 
enforcement of all policies related to the northern Indigenous peoples. Clan and tribal 
associations and religious practices were replaced with Marxist-Leninist principles of universal 
association while names and language shifted from Yupik to Russian. The Soviet authorities 
controlled education and little space was provided for teaching Yupik to school-aged children. 
Sporadically placed, small Indigenous communities were replaced with large, permanent 
	 92 
settlements. Small villages and ethnic enclaves were amalgamated to larger communities 
consisting of local Indigenous peoples and Russian settlers migrated from other parts of the 
Soviet Union, resulting in the complete de-territorialization39 of Yupiget.  
 The closing of Yupiget villages, and resettling the Yupiget population, effectively 
reduced claims to land used by Yupiget prior to the Soviet period. By combining the residents of 
separate, national villages with Russian settlers, no single group could claim historical ownership 
of the land and its resources. Furthermore, such policies removed them from their traditional 
hunting grounds and the associated hunting practices that had sustained Yupiget life prior to 
Soviet rule. Linguistic, spiritual, and other cultural practices were discouraged in these new, 
mixed settlements which supported the creation of a heterogeneous society of modern, Russian 
speaking citizens of the USSR. Additionally, large, collective economic practices replaced the 
small sea-hunting parties that sustained Yupiget for centuries. Ukreplenie removed Yupik 
control over their economic activity. Yupik hunters, who defined themselves by their 
relationship with the sea, became employees on state farms as labourers and brigade leaders in 
the early days (Kertulla, 2000) and were edged out of leadership positions by an influx of 
Russian settlers. As the new settlements were too far away from productive hunting grounds, 
Yupiget were forced to depend on state farms for employment, and the state labour and welfare 
systems for housing and goods in their new villages.  
 The intensity and scale of Soviet institutional changes ensured that Yupiget would likely 
never return to their pre-Soviet existence. It also cemented the asymmetrical relationship 
between Yupiget and the state that ensured their continued dependency. The progression of 
Soviet institution building in Chukotka was rapid and calculated. Three particular policies were 																																																								
39 De-territorialization is a term from Geography that aptly describes the situation faced by Yupiget. See Harris 
(2004) for an example of de-territorialization of Indigenous peoples in British Columbia, Canada. 	
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introduced that made it extremely difficult for Yupiget to return to the same political, economic 
and social conditions that existed prior to the establishment of the Soviet Union. Institutional 
developments such as the kultbaza, korenizatsiya and the establishment of an Indigenous 
intelligentsia were the Communist Party’s solution to ethnic inequality and advancing Marxist-
Leninist principles among Indigenous peoples (Gray, 2005). At first, certain cultural practices 
including traditional songs, attire and dances were encouraged to promote the idea that the Soviet 
Union was a successful multicultural society. However, cultural promotion was superseded by 
industrial development, and many cultural practices tied to place were lost to the environmental 
degradation associated with industrialization (Diatchkova, 2010). The speed and totality of the 
Soviet Union’s institutional development in the Russian Far East ensured a lasting equilibrium 
and that no clear path existed for the return to pre-Soviet institutions. The institutional pathway 
created by this critical juncture remains a significant barrier to Yupiget gaining self-
determination and political autonomy in the Russian Federation. 
 The Soviet period demonstrates a clear mix of institutional arrangements. The Soviet 
Union’s governing institutions quickly dominated and Marxist-Leninist ideology became an 
institution unto itself. However, the USSR’s ambitions to remain a powerful global superpower 
in the post-war era brought it to the arena of international engagement. As a partner40 in 
establishing the Arctic international cooperation regime, Soviet authorities agreed, at least in 
principle, to abide by certain international standards in the development of Indigenous peoples. 
Global institutional developments such as the UDHR and CERD occurred with the USSR’s full 
participation (Hazard, 1950). Their participation in Arctic international cooperation allowed 
forces opposed to the institutional domination of Yupiget to incubate. However, it was the policy 
of glasnost that led to the development of the second critical juncture in this thesis –the 																																																								
40 One could argue the USSR was a leader in establishing Arctic Cooperation. See Gorbachev’s Murmansk Speech. 
	 94 
dissolution of the Soviet Union that allowed for Yupiget admission into the ICC. 
Opportunity to Re-establish Yupiget Political Autonomy 1985-2000 
 Although the Soviet Union’s participation in global governance through its membership 
in the UN permitted a series of institutional developments counter to the isolating and repressive 
institutional design of the USSR, it was not until the coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in 
the mid-1980s that domestic situation started to change. His policies of glasnost and perestroika 
added to the changing institutional landscape and represent the beginning of a second critical 
juncture in the institutional development of the Soviet Union and, later the Russian Federation.  
For Indigenous peoples, such as Yupiget, this juncture would open up a different path of 
development that not only involved liberalization and the emergence of civil society on a 
domestic level, but also significant developments in terms of their international engagement. As 
central power weakened across the Soviet Union, institutional uncertainty swept across the 
regions. These two developments combined to offer a window of unprecedented institutional 
change in Chukotka with large-scale and lasting effects on Yupiget. Additionally, the relaxing of 
Soviet central controls, and the support that went with it, exposed a major institutional challenge: 
the high degree of state-dependency by Yupiget and the incredibly low socio-economic status of 
Yupiget despite said dependency.  
  The weakening of the Communist Party and its governing authority led to the eventual 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. The establishment of the Russian Federation offered an 
opportunity to reimagine the institutional design of the former RSFSR. Chukotka’s secession 
from Magadan changed the institutional structure of the regional and local governments in 
Chukotka. New legal frameworks were established by a presidential decree and legislation 
directed at helping Indigenous peoples to reclaim their culture, traditional lands and ways of 
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living (Kryazhkov, 2013). Protections for Indigenous peoples were written into the Constitution 
of the Russian Federation in 1993 and the regional administration in Chukotka initiated a 10-year 
plan aimed at improving the socio-economic status of Indigenous peoples (Diatchkova, 2010). 
Furthermore the federal law On Guarantees of the Rights of Small-Numbered Indigenous 
Peoples codified the Russian Federation’s responsibility towards its Indigenous peoples. While 
federal authorities appeared to be supporting internal self-determination for Indigenous peoples, 
the regional authorities took full advantage of their power and influence to establish a range of 
informal institutional developments in the vacuum left by the USSR’s dissolution. 
 Counter to the growing forces of institutional opportunity, the power of the regional 
governors went largely unchecked by the central authorities. Changes to the regional governing 
structure introduced by Yeltsin ended the dvoevlastie style of leadership in Chukotka. The 
regional fiefdoms41 created in the post-Soviet period illustrated the emergence of informal 
institution building. Defiant of federal laws, then governor Aleksandr Nazarov was suspicious of 
the increased international cooperation that led to a number of exchanges between Inuit of the 
circumpolar north. As noted in Chapter 4, he interfered with the development of international 
and bilateral Indigenous scientific cooperation and communication in Chukotka. As Indigenous 
and particularly Inuit (Yupiget) organizations appeared in Chukotka, the governor’s attitude 
towards cooperation became increasingly antagonistic. His successor, Roman Abramovich, was 
supportive of Inuit cooperation and exchange, including circumpolar organizations like the ICC. 
The burgeoning Indigenous civil society was able to grow quite quickly, largely due to the 
international connections made during the transitional period from the Soviet Union to the 
Russian Federation. 
 Russia’s increasing openness to international cooperation during the Yeltsin era allowed 																																																								
41 See Wilson, 2000. 
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for the creation of a range of new civil society institutions regionally and nationally. Enhanced 
international engagement such as the establishment of the Arctic Council led to a series of 
cooperative arrangements between Russian government agencies and their counterparts in 
Alaska and Canada whose influence forever changed Yupiget perspective. Regional and national 
Indigenous organizations such as RAIPON and its constituent members formed to defend and 
strengthen the status of Russia’s Indigenous peoples. Local Indigenous organizations such as 
YESC, ICC, NNC and ChAZTO were established to support a range of institutional 
developments consistent with Yupiget political autonomy. Institution building programs were 
initiated through bilateral cooperation between Canada and Russia to develop capacity for self-
determination and advance the institutions of self-government. Indeed, the reconnection with 
Yupik relatives in Alaska and the introduction of Yupiget to their broader Inuit kin across the 
circumpolar north set Yupiget down another development path that cannot entirely be undone. 
The ability of Yupiget to form representative political institutions and local NGOs, their 
admission into the ICC, and their reunification with Yupik from across the Bering Strait are 
direct outcomes of the institutional changes that began under Gorbachev and developed further 
during the first decade of the post-Soviet. Despite the recent return to repressive governance and 
centralization of power in the Russian Federation, Yupiget still participate in Arctic governance 
at the international level through the Arctic Council and their local constituent organizations are 
still operational. In fact, the Arctic Council remains the only forum where cooperation between 
Russia and Canada currently exists. Exposure to challenges faced by Inuit in other countries and 
involvement in political decision-making through international cooperation ended Yupiget 
isolation and introduced them to the wider Inuit struggle for self-determination and political 
autonomy. 
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(Re) Subjugation of Nascent Yupiget Political Institutions 2000-2015 
 Through the turn of the millennium, the path of political opportunity continued 
temporarily with the addition of the latter two major framework laws on Indigenous rights: On 
the General Principles for the Organization of Obshchiny of the Native Lesser-Numbered 
Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation (2000) and On the 
Territories of Traditional Nature Use by the Indigenous Numerically Small Peoples of the North, 
Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation (2001). With the federal framework for 
Indigenous legislation complete, the term “indigeneity” needed to be defined. An official list of 
40 Indigenous peoples was established by governmental decree. Yupiget were among the official 
Indigenous peoples of the Russian Federation whose rights were specified and protected by the 
Constitution of the Russian Federation.  
 However, these were the final major federal institutional developments42 to promote and 
allow for self-determination and political autonomy for Yupiget. As Putin’s first term as 
President ended in 2004, a series of reforms and amendments were enacted to give the central 
authorities more control over resource development and civil society. Immediately into Putin’s 
second term, amendments were introduced into the Indigenous federal legal framework to 
reconcile differences with other federal legislation such as the water and land codes. As 
Indigenous protections were stripped away, new institutional roadblocks were introduced to 
prevent civil disobedience. The creation of the Public Chamber and the introduction of the 
Foreign Agents Law were the hallmarks of the demise of grassroots civil society and of 
international cooperation and involvement in the socio-economic and political development of 
the Russian north (Crotty, Hall and Ljubownikow, 2014). These reforms essentially reversed the 
																																																								
42 There may be clauses in, and amendments to, other legislation that affect Yupiget self-determination and political 
autonomy either directly or indirectly. 
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progress made towards political autonomy for Yupiget. Furthermore, they signaled a return to 
the repressive nature of Soviet period policies towards Indigenous peoples in Russia.  
 At the regional level, the governor of Chukotka, Roman Abramovich, appeared more 
progressive towards the plight of Chukotka’s Indigenous peoples than his predecessor. 
Abramovich was responsible for much of the development of infrastructure in Chukotka and his 
modernization efforts were particularly noticeable in the capital, Anadyr. He also initiated the 
“Indigenous Representatives Council” in the regional Duma (Diatchkova, 2010). Abramovich 
was supportive of the cross-cultural exchanges initiated through the Canada-Russia agreement. 
While the federal government became a force against autonomy, the regional government began 
to support some autonomy for Indigenous peoples. However, the strength of the federal 
government grew immensely over the 2000s and into the following decade, and the waning 
influence of the regional governments became noticeable.  
As the federal legal framework became more unsympathetic towards Indigenous rights 
and protections, civil society and international cooperation, Abramovich’s successor, Roman 
Kopin, tried with some success to acquire federal funding to develop sea-mammal hunting and 
air travel subsidies in Chukotka. Whereas the regional government seems to support basic 
Yupiget institutional development, it is bound by the federal legal framework when it comes to 
establishing and growing Indigenous civil society. Through the 2000s, Indigenous civil society 
was influenced heavily by Yupiget participation in international cooperation through the Arctic 
Council and the ICC.  
 International cooperation throughout the 2000s was focused on two main challenges in 
Chukotka: humanitarian aid and capacity building. Each successive ICC Executive Council 
meeting called for increased support for Yupiget and noted the alarming downward trend in their 
socio-economic status compared to other Inuit. Bilateral relations between Alaska and Russia, 
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and Canada and Russia, continued to involve Yupiget in a range of capacity building initiatives. 
Hundreds of thousands of dollars were spent in Chukotka to promote Yupiget political autonomy 
and self-determination and to create business networks across North America. However, 
international tensions and disputes with Russia outside the Arctic started to change the context in 
which participation in international cooperation occurred. Longstanding institutional cooperation 
between Canada and Russia was hindered by changes to and, in some instances, the wholesale 
removal of institutions that had underpinned previous efforts at cooperation. Additionally, the 
mandates of organizations working together in the Arctic changed as well. Canada opted out of 
developmental assistance and redoubled their efforts on international trade and economic 
development. The Russian government increased its scope and control of regional development 
initiatives and became increasingly suspicious of foreign investment and cooperation. The result 
was a weakening of the institutions established through the international cooperation regime and 
a strengthening of the Kremlin’s influence on the relationships built among circumpolar 
neighbours.  
 Civil society and Indigenous activism was at its peak at the turn of the millennium. 
Yupiget were politically active in two local NGOs: YESC and ICC Russia. Furthermore, they 
participated in NNC and ChAZTO to maintain traditional economic and subsistence activities. 
They were established members of RAIPON and participated in a number of local and national 
initiatives aimed at political autonomy and self-determination. However, as the central 
authorities regained their influence, they sought more control over Indigenous NGOs. RAIPON 
was shut down for a year and the Kremlin’s candidate became its President during a widely 
suspect election process. Local NGOs with international connections were coerced into 
registering as “foreign agents” in accordance with changes to the Foreign Agents Law. It appears 
that the Russian Federation is swiftly returning to a period of subjugation of Yupiget institutional 
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development, with the Russian government resisting the notion of Yupiget political autonomy 
and self-determination as a construct of western influence.  
Conclusion 
 This thesis is certainly not the first research to comment on the resiliency of Soviet period 
institutions in the Russian Federation. In his work on local government reform, Young (2000) 
notes that during regime changes in Russia through the Imperial and Soviet periods, there were 
no new institutional designs and power structures to replace the old ones. Young and Wilson 
(2007) document the Soviet influence on local government reforms in the Russian Federation. 
Furthermore, the general arguments contained in this thesis are consistent with the work of 
distinguished Russian political scientist, Vladimir Gelman (2004), who demonstrated the 
volatility of informal institutions in filling the void left during the Soviet transition period. This 
thesis follows in the same tradition, but with the added dimension of charting efforts by 
Indigenous peoples in Russia to engage in international cooperation. 
 Yupiget political autonomy is intricately tied to two counter forces of institutional 
development: institutions as agents of political repression and institutions as agents of political 
development. The three critical junctures identified in this thesis are the establishment of Soviet 
rule in Chukotka, the relaxing of state controls initiated by Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost and 
perestroika and the ensuing dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the recentralization of power in 
the Russian Federation under Putin. All of these institutional changes influenced Yupiget ability 
to fight for self-determination in different ways. In some cases, institutional changes resulted in 
positive developments, and in other cases, the impact was largely negative.  
 The introduction of Yupiget to the international cooperative governing regime in the 
Arctic had a positive influence on Yupiget political development. While currently this does little 
to resolve the domestic challenges faced by Yupiget, it brought together the international Inuit 
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community. No longer are Yupiget isolated from their circumpolar neighbours. They participate 
in a variety of international forums because of this relationship and are even allowed restricted 
visa-free travel to Alaska. While the forces of institutional development within Chukotka are 
currently rather benign, the influence on Yupiget maintained by Inuit internationalism has lasting 
consequences. Even through a rapid period of institutional change, Yupiget political autonomy 
remains elusive because of the lasting effect of the Soviet period policies towards Indigenous 
peoples, and the return of the power vertikal. It appears the more the current authorities in Russia 
evoke Soviet era nostalgia amongst the Russian population, the more repressive their policies are 
towards Indigenous peoples.   
 Political, economic and social institutions related to Indigenous peoples established 
within the Soviet Union largely persevered throughout the lifespan of the USSR and 
subsequently affect Yupiget contemporary political organization in the Russian Federation. 
Interrupted by a short, transitional period in which a variety of new institutional arrangements 
were introduced into the emerging Russian Federation, many of the institutional legacies of the 
Soviet Union persisted or were introduced as reforms following the tumultuous economic 
uncertainty of the 1990s. However, Yupiget were extremely proactive in building institutions to 
promote Inuit culture, rights and political autonomy, guided by their introduction to the ICC, and 
in concert with its constituent organizations throughout the Arctic. As the broader path of 
institutional development in the Russian Federation begins to resemble that of the Soviet period, 
Yupiget institutions continue to operate, albeit in a much more hostile context than the one in 
which they were created.   
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Chapter 7: Conclusions 
 In this thesis, I argue the structural and ideological institutions established within the 
former Soviet Union and Russian Federation have directly affected the political organization of 
Yupiget. Additionally, institutional norms established by state authorities throughout the Soviet 
Union and the Russian Federation continue to impact Russia’s Indigenous peoples, including 
Yupiget. Yet powerful globalizing forces near the end of the 20th century have increased the 
visibility of Yupiget in the circumpolar north and helped communicate their challenges to global 
audiences. A variety of institutions were established at the local, regional, federal and 
international levels to help resolve these challenges. However, Yupiget political organization and 
sources of its support are currently stagnant. Any available domestic support and resources 
cannot be used to promote self-determination and political autonomy, while any outside support 
is perceived as foreign interference and Yupiget efforts to achieve greater political, economic 
and social control perceived as anti-Russian. Yupiget political institutions are caught in a 
difficult conundrum. The Soviet influence altered any direct path towards autonomy, while the 
influence of, and participation in, institutions of international cooperation continue to support 
Yupiget inherent rights to self-determination. Furthermore, the Russian Federation has tightened 
the legal framework by which civil society and NGOs can operate, limiting opportunities to 
collect and share resources with organizations operating outside of Russia. 
 Historical institutionalism is an appropriate and useful framework with which to explain 
why Yupiget do not possess the same opportunities to exercise political autonomy as their Inuit 
counterparts across the circumpolar north. Critical junctures and their subsequent path 
dependencies suitably illustrate why Yupiget cannot return to their pre-Soviet levels of self-
determination and political autonomy by highlighting the difficulties in deviating from their 
current path trajectory in the Russian Federation. An examination of the intersection of two 
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ostensibly contrasting paths of political development suggests that even though there is little 
chance of Yupiget gaining political autonomy in the current domestic political climate, there are 
still forces that support their autonomy and further their pursuit for self-determination. While 
their political development is currently impeded, changes in the domestic political situation in 
Russia and/or Chukotka could lead to a redoubling of efforts of the international community to 
support Yupiget political autonomy.  
 One of the most obvious limitations to this study is its lack of a current and direct 
Yupiget perspective. From the outset of the research design, interviews in Chukotka were 
intended to be the main form of primary data collection. However, due to stark changes in the 
diplomatic relationship between Russia and Canada over the course of this research, travel to 
Chukotka and interviews with Yupiget were deemed to be unsuccessful at best, and dangerous at 
worst. One of the contingency plans was to arrange interviews with Yupiit in Alaska and 
members of the ICC executives in Canada and Alaska. Again, external developments, in this 
case the introduction of legislative limits on civil society within Russia, affected my ability to 
recruit ICC participants because my own concern for the potential of a negative effect on 
Yupiget. Rather than potentially exacerbate a negative situation, I decided to collect data one 
more step removed from Yupiget. My interview participants were extremely candid and their 
input provided rich contextual data about the situation of Indigenous peoples in the Russian Far 
East and the relationships developed between Russia and Canada and Inuit/Yupiget. However, 
their experience with Yupiget was limited. Thus, there is a large gap in what we know about how 
Yupiget presently experience their political, economic and social development. Therefore, I rely 
heavily on the data provided by journalists and other scholars.  
 Another limitation is the lack of representation of Russian-language materials. I collected 
a variety of Soviet and post-Soviet period Russian language articles, stories and other published 
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materials, but my ability to interpret and understand Russian language is extremely limited. The 
lack of Russian language materials from this thesis represents a literature bias that is unavoidable 
yet problematic nonetheless. I certainly avoided problems in appraising the quality of evidence 
presented in Soviet period publications in the former USSR. However, those materials could 
have contributed to the overall validity of this thesis. The lack of Russian and Yupiget 
perspectives in this thesis contribute to a very “western” understanding of Yupiget political 
autonomy and self-determination. While it would have been beneficial to attempt to account for 
a number of different perspectives, my own understanding of the phenomena and case study 
under investigation would still heavily influence the final product. My only recourse towards 
these limitations is to explicitly acknowledge their existence. 
 This thesis broadly supports historical institutionalism as credible framework with which 
to study political phenomena in the Russian Federation. However, a case study of Yupiget 
political autonomy offers a new contribution towards using historical institutionalism to explain 
institutional development and influence. Future research could use more of the tools of historical 
institutionalism to further advance understandings of both the theoretical framework and Yupiget 
political autonomy. Another possible avenue of further research could include using historical 
institutionalism to investigate the institutional development of similar groups to generate 
comparisons. The political development of Saami and other Indigenous peoples are all possible 
case studies of institutional development that would benefit from an historical institutionalist 
perspective. 
 In addition, as noted above, any future inquiry into Yupiget political development would 
benefit from the inclusion of Inuit, and more importantly, Yupiget voices and perspectives. 
Furthermore, such studies would benefit by being conducted in partnership with organizations 
such as the ICC or the Arctic Council in order to utilize their long-standing relationships with 
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Yupiget, and other Indigenous peoples in Chukotka. Such relationships are an important factor in 
conducting safe, ethical and effective research in the social sciences (Association of Canadian 
Universities for Northern Studies, 2003). In addition to Yupiget, the political development of 
Chukchi, who share an historical connection with Yupiget, would help to determine how a titular 
minority‘s political development occurs compared to another Indigenous minority in the Russian 
Far East. For example, do Chukchi experience more political autonomy by virtue of their 
participation in state governing institutions such as the regional Duma and Okrug Charter, or 
does the increasing power of the central authorities set limits to their autonomous arrangement? 
There are certainly many avenues of inquiry open to furthering our understanding of institutional 
development of Indigenous peoples, and a wide range of prospective cases to further study 
political autonomy and self-determination in the Russian Far East. This thesis outlines only one 
of many paths. 
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Appendix 1: Historical Institutionalism Concept Map 
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Appendix 2: Canada-USSR/Russian Federation Arctic Cooperation Concept Map 
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